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I. INTRODUCTION
The success of earlier efforts to bring order out of the chaos of
fixture law has not been such as to inspire confidence in ventures of
this character.' The observation made by a Missouri Judge in 1877
that "the law in regard to fixtures is in a somewhat chaotic state,"
holds true today, as does his statement that "there is a most embar-
rassing conflict in the adjudged cases." 2 Two developments, however,
the appearance in the cases of the institutional doctrine and the grow-
ing popularity of the package mortgage, which covers not only the
building but the automatic heater, air conditioning unit, kitchen
cabinet installation, ventilating and exhaust fans, laundry equipment,
range, refrigerator, home-freezer units, garbage receptacle, and other
such conveniences, suggest the need for a stock-taking, an appraisal
of the decisions and trends from the standpoint of the real estate
mortgagee.
Traditionally, the starting point for discussions of fixture law
has been Chief Justice Bartley's formula in the leading case of Teaff
v. Hewitt,' where he said:
". .. the united application of the following requisites will
be found the safest criterion of a fixture:
"1st, Actual annexation to the realty or something ap-
purtenant thereto. 2d, Appropriation to the use or purpose of
that part of the realty with which it is connected. 3d, The intn-
tion of the party making the annexation, to make the article a
permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being inferred
from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of
the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of an-
nexation, and the purpose or use for which the annexation has
been made."
t LL.B. 1934, De Paul University; Professor of Law, De Paul University; author
of REAL ESTATE LAW (1946).
1. E. g., Binghman, Some Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures (1907)
7 COL. L. REv. 1, where the author indicates his purpose was to build "a solid path-
way across this veritable slough of despond."
2. State Savings Bank v. Kercheval, 65 Mo. 682, 686 (1877).
3. 1 Ohio St. 511, 529-530 (1853).
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II. THE THREE TESTS
The fact of physical annexation to the land furnishes such an
obvious and understandable link with the realty that courts have clung
with great tenacity to the annexation requirement. Even in early
times, however, the rule was not without its exceptions. As long
ago as 1522 it was held that if a man has a mill and the miller takes
the millstone out of the mill in order to make it grind the better, al-
though it is actually severed from the mill yet it remains parcel thereof
as if it had always been lying upon the other stone, and accordingly
it will pass by a lease or conveyance of the mill.4 To accommodate
such instances of temporary disannexation it became necessary to re-
phrase the rule in terms of "habitual annexation" rather than "per-
manent annexation." 5 In Liford's case 6 it was observed that a house
key passes as part of the freehold. Other instances thereafter occurred
where, to give effect to the manifest intention of the parties, objects
were treated as accessions to the freehold despite the absence of physical
annexation,7 and it was ultimately explained that such cases were
governed by the doctrine of constructive annexation,8 which in time
won universal recognition. 9 The mere appearance in the reported
cases of the phrase "constructive annexation" is significant, for it
affords ample proof that factors other than physical annexation had
begun to furnish a criterion of accession to the freehold. Even where
courts continued to profess allegiance to the requirement of physical
annexation, it was said that constructive annexation must suffice with
respect to many things that are essential to the use of the premises."
Eventually courts adhering to the older doctrine found it neces-
sary to marshal arguments in defense of their position. In support
of their views it was argued that by definition a fixture is something
affixed to the realty." To this argument there are two adequate an-
4. Wistow's Case of Gray's Inn, 14 Hen. VIII, f. 25b (1522).
5. Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1839) (leading case); Bishop v.
Bishop, 11 N. Y. 123 (1854).
6. 11 Coke 46b (1614).
7. Smith v. Carroll, 4 Greene 146 (Iowa 1853) (farm fence not fastened to
ground); Roderick v. Sanborn, 106 Me. 159, 76 Atl. 263 (1909) (storm windows
and storm doors stored in barn); Byrne v. Werner, 138 Mich. 328, 101 N. W. 555
(1904) (building material on site of partially completed building); Snedeker v.
Warring, 12 N. Y. 170 (1854) (massive object held in place only by attraction of
gravity) ; Ripley v. Paige, 12 Vt. 353 (1839) (fencing material distributed on land
for immediate use in fencing).
8. Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1839) ; Note, 109 A. L. R. 1424
(1937).
9. EwELL, FixruREs 14 (2d ed. 1905) ; Note, 109 A. L. R. 1424 (1937).
10. Wolford v. Baxter, 33 Minn. 12, 21 N. W. 744 (1884) ; Walker v. Sherman,
20 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1839).
11. Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1839); Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio
St. 511 (1853).
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swers: In the first place the word "fixture" is of modern coinage and
is not encountered in the early reports.'" Cases dispensing with the
physical annexation requirement will be found long before this expres-
sion gained currency.'" In the second place it is unthinkable today
that important questions of conflicting economic interests should be
resolved by a study of words-as well resort to numerology.
Again, differences arose as to the decree of annexation required.
By some it was said that slight annexation, as by bands or in any
other way, so that the article could easily be detached, would suffice.'"
This mystic devotion to attachment by bolts and screws was quickly
disposed of by the answer that it is illogical to make cases involving
important interests turn upon the presence or absence of the slightest
tack or ligament.' 5 The older view, that an article could be deemed a
fixture only where severance would occasion material injury to the
freehold, still found occasional expression, 6 but stultifying exceptions
could usually be marshalled from the court's own reports.Y-
Ultimately the progress of industrialization resolved the issue
against the adherents of physical annexation. In Lawton v. Salmon,'"
Lord Mansfield held that salt pans affixed with mortar to the brick
floor of a salt works were real estate passing to the heir, for the salt
spring is a valuable inheritance, but no profit arises from it unless there
is a salt work, which consists of a building for the purpose of con-
taining the pans. Here is a clear recognition that the salt pans passed
because adapted and designed for an establishment for the manufacture
of salt.'9 In Farrar v. Stackpole 2o it was held that a detachable mill
chain passed with the mill, on the ground that things fitted and pre-
pared to be used with the real estate become part thereof. This new
view, which substituted constructive annexation by adaptation for the
older requirement of physical annexation, met with sharp rejection in
Walker v. Sherman,2' where the court sought to hold the doctrine of
constructive annexation within narrow confines by enlarging upon the
12. Sheen v. Rickie, 5 M. & W. 175, 182 (1839) ; EWELL, FIXTURES 127 (2d ed.
1905).
13. E. g., cases cited notes 4 and 6 supra.
14. Walker v. Sherman, 20 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1839) ; Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio
St. 511 (1853).
15. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
16. Hill v. Wentworth, 28 Vt. 428 (1856).
17. Ripley v. Paige, 12 Vt. 353 (1839) (fencing materials distributed on land for
immediate use in fencing pass with the land although not physically annexed).
18. 1 H. Black. 259, n. (1782).
19. Farrar v. Stackpole, 6 Greenl. 154 (Me. 1829).
20. Ibid.
21. 20 Wend. 636 (N. Y. 1839).
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dire consequences to be anticipated from an expansion of the doctrine.22
The rebuff proved temporary, however, for only two years later in a
landmark decision it was held that detachable rolls in a rolling mill
passed to a real estate mortgagee with the land, the court observing
that almost any sort of machinery, however complex in its structure,
may with care and trouble be taken to pieces and removed without
injury to the building, yet just as the easily removable doors and
windows of a dwelling are fixtures, for without them the dwelling
would be unfit for use, so the machinery of a manufactory without
which it would not be a manufactory at all, must pass as part of the
freehold.23
Despite occasional setbacks 24 this view had obtained a clear as-
cendancy before the turn of the century 2' and is now all but horn-
book. In an overwhelming majority of the modern decisions, ma-
chinery indispensable to the functioning of an industrial plant is
deemed a fixture passing to the real estate mortgagee.26 Where the
adaptation factor characteristic of the industrial cases is strong, courts
dispense with the annexation requirement altogether, even though the
article is useful elsewhere than on the mortgaged premises.
A natural extension of this reasoning has taken place to busi-
nesses other than industrial concerns, such as hotels and apartment
22. Such adaptation theory, the court observed, might become extended even to
domestic animals on a farm, and certainly to many implements in a manufactory
which would never be recognized as fixtures. Ibid., 654.
23. Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
24. The actual holding in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853) was to the
effect that machinery in a woolen mill connected with the motive power only by
bands and straps did not pass to the real estate mortgagee even though such ma-
chinery was essential to the business. However, in Case Mfg. Co. v. Garven, 45
Ohio St. 289, 13 N. E. 493 (1887) it was held that machinery supplying motive
power to a mill was a fixture though removable without material injury. In Wolford
v. Baxter, 33 Minn. 12, 21 N. W. 744 (1884) the court expressly declined to extend
the doctrine of constructive annexation to large casks or hogsheads, fermenting tubs,
and a copper cooler in a brewery, although the court was prepared to concede that
machinery in a structure erected especially for a particular kind of manufacturing
.is a fixture though only slightly or not at all physically connected with the building.
25. Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327
(1890) (leading case); Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Knowles, 8 Del. Ch.
106, 67 Atl. 961 (1896) ; Morotock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer Bros., 92 Va. 747, 24 S. E.
393 (1896).
26. Re Theodore A. Kochs Co., 120 F. 2d 603 (7th Cir. 1941); Knickerbocker
Trust Co. v. Penn Cordage Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 305, 58 Atl. 409 (1904); Roos v. Fairy
Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 305, 5 A. 2d 569 (1939) ; First Nat. Bank v. Nativi, 49 A. 2d 760
(Vt. 1946) ; Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16 S. E. 2d 345 (1941) ;
1 JONES, MORTGAGES 725 (8th ed. 1928) ; see Note 41 A. L. R. 601, 608 (1926), sup-
plemented 88 A. L. R. 1114, 1115 (1934), and 99 A. L. R. 144, 145 (1935).
27. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kimball, 163 Ore. 31, 94 P. 2d 1101 (1939)
(trays not annexed to building but indispensable to functioning of prune dryer);
Thomsen v. Cullen, 196 Wis. 581, 219 N. W. 439 (1929) (flasks necessary to opera-
tion of foundry business but not attached to premises); see Note 109 A. L. R. 1424
(1937).
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buildings," although, in this area resistance to the newer views is
more pronounced. Gas stoves and electric refrigerators are so es-
sential to the functioning of an apartment building that, according
to many modern decisions, they must be deemed fixtures.2 Rollaway
beds in an apartment building have been held to be fixtures although
in no wise attached to the building. 0 However, some courts seem
reluctant to allow further encroachments upon the annexation test.
For example, in Oklahoma, Murphy beds fastened to the wall on
pivots are considered fixtures, but rollaway beds which are not fas-
tened to the wall, are not.31 In New York, gas ranges in an apart-
ment house, attached to the building only by a simple coupling to the
gas service pipe were held to be chattels removable as against a sub-
sequent real estate mortgagee.82 These last decisions, and others to
like effect, seen unduly regressive. In a situation calling for intelligent
adaptation to the changes modern appliances have wrought in our
mode of life, they continue to attach "mystic importance to attachment
by bolts and screws." 83 As a result of the New York decisions, it is
a universal practice in that state to include a chattel mortgage clause
in each real estate mortgage, which of itself is proof that the decisions
fail to meet the community's needs.
A significant development of modern times is the position of pre-
eminence achieved by the intention test.34 Indeed, adaptation and
mode of annexation are now frequently regarded as not separate tests
at all, but as circumstances throwing light on the question of inten-
tion.85 In determining the intention of the annexor of the article,
where a controversy has arisen as to whether or not such article is a
fixture, great weight must be accorded to the factor of the relationship
of the parties."8 Since a tenant ordinarily expects to take with him,
28. Land Title Bank and Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A. 2d 282 (1940).
29. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Swanson, 286 Ill. App. 278, 3 N. E.
2d 324 (1936); First Mortgage Bond Co. v. London, 259 Mich. 688, 244 N. W.
203 (1932) ; Glueck & Co. v. Powell, 227 Mo. App. 1226, 61 S. W. 2d 406 (1933) ;
Knoxville Gas Co. v. W. I. Kirby & Sons, 161 Tenn. 490, 32 S. W. 2d 1054 (1930).
Contra: Madfes v. Beverly Development Corporation, 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787
(1929). See note 64 A. L. R. 1222 (1930), supplemented 169 A. L. R. 478 (1947).
30. Doll v. Guthrie, 233 Ky. 77, 24 S. W. 2d 947 (1930) ; Leisle v. Welfare Bldg.
& Loan Assn., 232 Wis. 440, 287 N. W. 739 (1939).
31. Gray v. Prudential Ins. Co., 182 Okla. 342, 77 P. 2d 563 (1938); Accord,
Dunn v. Assets Realization Co., 141 Ore. 298, 16 P. 2d 370 (1933).
32. Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
Judge Cardozo, who voted with the majority of the court, later characterized this
holding as "almost farcical" and stated that the decision turned on considerations of
stare decisis. Cardozo, The Stare Decisis of the Future, 55 N. Y. S. B. A. REP. 293,
295-296 (1932).
33. Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637, 641 (1914).
34. Killian v. Hubbard, 69 S. D. 289, 9 N. W. 2d 700 (1943).
35. Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16 S. E. 2d 345 (1941).
36. Blake-McFall Co. v. Wilson, 98 Ore. 626, 193 Pac. 902 (1921); Planters
Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S. C. 16, 128 S. E. 876 (1925).
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when he vacates the premises, all articles he has installed thereon, it
would be absurd to ascribe to him the intention to make such articles
a permanent part of the real estate, and normally he will be allowed
to remove such articles, where removal will not cause material injury
to the realty and where the lease does not restrict or prohibit such
removal. A fortiori, where the annexation is made with the land-
owner's consent by one having no estate in the land, and hence no
interest in enhancing its value, an agreement that the structure shall
not become part of the freehold will be implied in the absence of cir-
cumstances tending to show a different intention."7 On the other
hand, articles that would, if installed by a tenant, be considered re-
movable personal property, will, if installed by a real estate mortgagor,
be deemed fixtures, since normally a landowner's additions to his prop-
erty are intended to be permanent.8"
It has often been said that intention, as the word is used in deci-
sions employing the intention test, is not the secret intention of the
annexor. The test is an objective one, and intention is determined
from the nature of the article, relation of the parties, adaptation, mode
of annexation and all the surrounding circumstances. 9 This exclusion
of secret intent, it is plain, is intended primarily for the benefit of third
parties. It is merely another way of saying that as to third parties
who act in reliance on appearances and in ignorance of secret intent,
the intention revealed by appearances must govern. This is certainly
the meaning of the rule in the situation where a bona fide purchaser
or mortgagee of the real estate is protected against a prior unrecorded
conditional sale contract. As between mortgagor and mortgagee,
where the issue involves articles annexed after the execution of the
mortgage, evidence of secret intention is again excluded,"0 since no
one could disprove the mortgagor's assertions regarding his secret
intention, and were this secret intention to prevail he would be
enabled to strip the premises bare.
A word of caution is in order as to reliance upon early cases
holding that this or that article is or is not a fixture. As was aptly
said in Strain v. Green: 41 "Many early cases though not expressly
37. Killian v. Hubbard, 69 S. D. 289, 9 N. W. 2d 700 (1943). However, it has been
argued that articles installed by licensees and tenants should be governed by the doc-
trine of accession, rather than by the intention test. Niles, The Intention Test in; the
Law of Fixtures, 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 66, 83-90 (1934).
38. Tyler v. Hayward, 235 Mich. 674, 209 N. W. 801 (1926); Blake-McFall
Co. v. Wilson, 98 Ore. 626, 193 Pac. 902 (1920); Fuson v. Whitaker, 28 Tenn.
App. 338, 190 S. W. 2d 305 (1945).
39. Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170 (1854) (leading case) ; Walker v. Puck,
236 Iowa 686, 8 N. W. 2d 701 (1943); Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 172
P. 2d 216 (1946).
40. Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170 (1854).
41. 25 Wash. 2d 692, 172 P. 2d 216 (1946).
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overruled at least have become outmoded . . .The law relating to
fixtures has slowly and gradually changed as times have changed.
Various household appliances, not formerly held to be fixtures, have
become so in this 'built-in' era. But the major changes are probably
the result of an awareness of the fact that the luxuries of a given
generation become the necessities of the next." Thus, there is evidence
that in early times window glass went to the personal representative
and not to the heir of a deceased landowner, for then a house was
perfect, although it had no glass." As early as Queen Elizabeth's
time, however, window glass had moved into the category of fixtures.3
III. EFFECT AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES OF MORTGAGE CLAUSE
EXPRESSLY PROVIDING THAT ENUMERATED ARTICLES ARE
FIXTURES
A mortgagee who forecloses his mortgage on a hotel, apartment
building, factory, or other functioning unit naturally wishes to take
over the property as a complete and functioning entity. He will wish
to avoid taking over the building only, stripped of the articles that
make it possible to carry on business; yet in view of the confusion in
the cases as to what articles are to be deemed fixtures, for the mort-
gagee to place reliance on the mortgage alone as covering all neces-
sary articles installed in the building is to run a very real and wholly
unnecessary risk. 4 One approach to this problem requires resort to
the rule that intention is a vital factor in determining whether or not
an article is a fixture.45 It is well established, for example, that a
landowner may agree, either expressly or impliedly, with a credit
vendor of chattels, that articles when installed on the land shall not
become fixtures, but on the contrary shall remain personal property
until fully paid for, and such an agreement will be given effect as be-
tween the parties thereto. Conversely, if it is expressly agreed
between the mortgagor and mortgagee of land that certain articles shall
be deemed to be fixtures, such agreement is binding as between the
42. Bingham, Some Suggestions Concernitg the Law of Fixtures, 7 CoL. L. REV.
1, 7 (1907).
43. Ibid. Gas chandeliers were once regarded as chattels. Capehart v. Foster,
61 Minn. 132, 63 N. W. 257 (1895). See also Hook v. Bolton, 199 Mass. 244, 247,
85 N. E. 175, 176 (1908) and Mr. Justice Crane dissenting in Madfes v. Beverly
Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 19, 166 N. E. 787, 790 (1929).
44. E. g., compare Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250 Pa. 194, 95 AtI.
451 (1915) with First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Adams, 218 Wis. 406, 261 N. W. 16
(1935).
45. See note 34 supra.
46. Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327
(1890) ; Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N. W. 659 (1931) ; Cohen v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 51 R. I. 153, 152 Atl. 693 (1930).
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parties,47 except as limited in some jurisdictions by the doctrine of
inherent chattels.41 Proceeding upon this theory, a mortgagee may
insert immediately following the land description in his mortgage, a
clause enumerating various articles and providing that these "are and
shall be deemed to be fixtures and an accession to the freehold and a
part of the realty as between the parties hereto, their heirs, executors,
administrators, trustees, successors or assigns, and all persons claim-
ing by, through or under them, and shall be deemed to be a portion
of the security for the indebtedness herein mentioned and to be covered
by this mortgage."
IV. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE TREATED AS A CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Instead of attempting to characterize mortgaged articles as fix-
tures, a real estate mortgagee may seek to have his mortgage operate
as a mortgage on chattels. An instrument mortgaging both real
estate and personal property may be a valid chattel mortgage as to
the personal property included.49 This is a common practice in New
York, made necessary by that state's rigorous application of its doc-
trine of "inherent chattels."
The fact that the clause in the real estate mortgage is somewhat
general in its description of the articles does not militate against its
effectiveness. As between mortgagor and mortgagee, a particular de-
scription of the chattels is not required in a chattel mortgage,"0 and
even as to third parties, such as purchasers of the chattels, a descrip-
tion designating the chattels as all the mortgagor's property of a
certain kind in a specified locality is generally considered sufficient."1
Where a real estate mortgage contains a chattel mortgage clause,
the question naturally arises as to the effect of recording such a docu-
ment in the land records only.
Nearly all states make some statutory provision for the recording
or filing of conditional sale contracts and chattel mortgages in some
public office.52 In a few states the law does not provide for' land
records separate from personal property records. In such jurisdictions
47. Guardian Depositors' Corp. v. Keller, 286 Mich. 403, 282 N. W. 194 (1938);
First Mortgage Bond Co. v. London, 259 Mich. 688, 244 N. W. 203 (1932).
48. Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E. 787 (1929).
49. Pierce v. Bound Brook Engine & Mfg. Co., 274 Fed. 221 (D. N. J. 1921);
Durst v. Battson. 9 Cal. 2d 156. 69 P. 2d 992 (1937) ; General Synod of The Reformed
Church in America v. Bonac Realty Corp., 297 N. Y. 119, 75 N. E. 2d 841 (1947).
50. Abernathy v. Worthy, 221 Ala. 527, 129 So. 472 (1930).
51. Emick v. Swafford. 107 Kan. 209, 191 Pac. 490 (1920). See EWELL, Fix-
TUREs 464-469 (2d ed. 1905).
52. Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COL. L. REv. 617, 638
(1931).
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a real estate mortgage containing a chattel mortgage clause is, when
recorded, effective as to third parties both as a real estate mortgage
and as a chattel mortgage.53 Hence, under the usual rule, in the
absence of actual notice on the part of the mortgagee, such a mortgage
would enjoy priority over prior unrecorded conditional sale contracts
or chattel mortgages which the law requires to be recorded. Likewise
such a mortgage would be operative as a recorded chattel mortgage
as against subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and creditors. This
would be true even if in actual practice different sets of books are
kept and the mortgage is recorded only in the land records.54
However, it is now almost the universal requirement that the
public records of chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts
(personal property records) be kept separate and apart from the rec-
ords of deeds and mortgages (land records).'- In such jurisdictions,
a real estate mortgage which contains a chattel mortgage clause but
which has been filed only in the land records must be treated as an
unrecorded chattel mortgage."6 Will such a mortgage enjoy priority
over prior unrecorded chattel mortgages and conditional sale con-
tracts? The prevailing rule is to the effect that a subsequent chattel
mortgagee is protected against a prior unrecorded chattel mortgage
even though he has failed to record his document,5 7 and as a matter
of business practice, it is perfectly obvious that recording of the second
chattel mortgage is of importance only to subsequent dealers in the
chattels."8 Hence a real estate mortgagee whose mortgage contains
a chattel mortgage clause should ordinarily be protected against prior
unrecorded conditional sale contracts and chattel mortgages.59 To
be sure, in the few jurisdictions where the law does not require record-
ing of conditional sale contracts, so that unrecorded conditional sale
contracts are valid as to third parties, the rule will be otherwise.
Where the real estate mortgagee has actual knowledge of the prior
unrecorded chattel mortgage or conditional sale contract, he will not
be protected against it."°
Assuming that a real estate mortgage which contains a chattel
mortgage clause and which has been recorded only in the land records
53. Woodbury Glass Co. v. Beeson, 73 Ind. App. 385, 127 N. E. 573 (1920),
5 MiNN. L. REv. 143; Long v. Gorman, 100 Mo. App. 45, 79 S. W. 180 (1902).
54. See note 53 supra.
55. Note, 15 WAsH. L. Rav. 252, 255 (1940).
56. Pruitt v. Parker, 201 N. C. 696, 161 S. E. 212 (1931).
57. Spellman v. Beeman, 70 Fla. 575, 70 So. 589 (1916); Dixon v. Tyree, 92
Kan. 137, 139 Pac. 1026 (1914); See Note L. R. A. 244 (1916D). Contra: Cot-
trell v. Merchants and Mechanics Bank, 89 Ga. 508, 15 S. E. 944 (1892).
58. Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A UiqIF. LAws ANN. 79 (1924).
59. Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929) ; Kleps,
Uniformity Versus Uniform Legislation, 24 CoRN. L. Q. 394, 404 (1939).
60. Bogert, op. cit. supra note 58, at 80.
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must be treated as an unrecorded chattel mortgage, we must next deal
with questions of priority arising between the real estate mortgagee
under the chattel mortgage clause and persons subsequently acquiring
rights in the chattel. An unrecorded chattel mortgage is valid only
as between the parties and as to third persons who acquire rights
in the mortgaged chattel with knowledge of the chattel mortgage. 6'
The same is true of a mortgage covering both land and chattels.62
Consequently, to be effective in its coverage of chattels as against
creditors and third persons, a mortgage which covers both real and
personal property must be recorded in the personal property records
as well as in the land records.638  Where the mortgage is recorded in
both the land records and the personal property records it is effective
both as to the land and chattels.64 It is, of course, a common practice
in the mortgage loan business to require the mortgagor to execute
a separate chattel mortgage, which is filed in the personal property
records.
Where the real estate mortgage is also filed as a chattel mortgage
or where a supplementary chattel mortgage is filed, the mortgagee
enjoys the protection of the rule that where chattels subject to a
recorded chattel mortgage are removed from the premises and there-
after sold to a purchaser, such purchaser takes subject to the rights
of the chattel mortgagee.65 This is in contrast to decisions denying
protection to a real estate' mortgagee against removal and sale of
fixtures to a bona fide purchaser.66
A chattel mortgage given concurrently with a real estate mort-
gage for the purpose of insuring against possible mistake as to the
character of the articles as fixtures does not fix the character of the
articles as personalty."
61. Detroit Trust Co. v. Detroit City Service Co., 262 Mich. 14, 247 N. W. 76
(1933).
62. Wood v. Whelen, 93 I1. 153 (1879); Raymond v. Clark, 46 Conn. 129
(1878).
63. In re 671 Prospect Ave. Holding Corp., 105 F. 2d 960 (2d Cir. 1939) ; Bayne
v. Brewer Pottery Co., 90 Fed. 754 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1898) ; Rudolph Wurlitzer Co.
v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 Atl. 641 (1929) ; Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Penn Cordage
Co., 66 N. J. Eq. 305, 58 Atl. 409 (1904); Pruitt v. Parker, 201 N. C. 696, 161
S. E. 212 (1931).
64. Pierce v. Bound Brook Engine & Mfg. Co., 274 Fed. 221 (D. N. J. 1921).
Refiling may be necessary to keep the chattel lien alive. Friedman, The Scope of
Mortgage Liens on Fixtures and Personal Property in New York, 7 FoRD. L. REv. 331,
342 (1938).
65. Flora v. Julesberg Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545 (1920); Hendley
v. Harris, 48 Kan. 606, 29 Pac. 1145 (1892) ; Note, 57 A. L. R. 702 (1928). See,
however, Hanna, Extension of Public Recordation 31 CoL. L. REv. 617, 648 (1931).
66. Cases cited note 216 infra.
67. Studley v. Ann Arbor Say. Bank, 112 Mich. 181, 70 N. W. 426 (1897);
Homestead Land Co. v. Becker, 96 Wis. 206, 71 N. W. 117 (1897); cf. Binidey v.
Forkner, 117 Ind. 176, 19 N. E. 753 (1889).
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V. PRIORITIES BETWEEN REAL ESTATE MORTGAGEE AND HOLDER
OF PRIOR CHATTEL MORTGAGE OR CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT
A. EFFECT OF FILING IN PERSONAL PROPERTY RECORDS: Hav-
ing a title search made of the land records is, of course, standard prac-
tice for an intending mortgagee. The question remains as to whether
or not such mortgagee is also required to search the personal property
records for documents affecting articles installed on the mortgaged
premises.
In a majority of the states a real estate mortgagee is not required
to search the personal property records and, absent actual notice, is
protected against prior chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts
recorded only in the personal property records." The reason com-
monly adduced in support of the rule is that prospective purchasers
or mortgagees of land cannot be expected to search records which
relate primarily to personal property.6 9 In these states, in the absence
of a provision comparable to Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, recording of the conditional sale contract in the land records
may be without legal effect, since in its usual form, at least, it is not
a document entitled to recording in those records. Hence, a condi-
tional vendor or chattel mortgagee is powerless to protect himself
against loss of his lien where the articles in question are annexed to
land so as to become fixtures and the land is subsequently sold or
mortgaged to a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee. Such a situation is
manifestly unjust to conditional vendors. It has been suggested, how-
ever, that the conditional vendor can secure protection by procuring
from the landowner a waiver of his interest in the article, which
waiver may be recorded in the land records."0
In those jurisdictions where the recording law makes no distinc-
tion between instruments relating to realty and instruments relating to
personalty, recording of a conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage
imparts constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
of the land, even though in actual practice separate sets of records
are maintained.
71
68. Elliott v. Hudson, 18 Cal. App. 642, 124 Pac. 103 (1912) ; Trull v. Fuller,
28 Me. 545 (1848); Tibbets v. Horne, 65 N. H. 242, 23 AtI. 145 (1891); XXth
Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App. 188,
10 N. E. 2d 229 (1937) ; Smith v. Waggoner, 50 Wis. 155, 6 N. W. 568 (1880).
69. 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1022 (1929); Note, 15 WASH. L. REv. 252 (1940);
Note, 13 A. L. R. 448, 485 (1921), supplemented 73 id. 748, 773 (1931) ; 88 id. 1318,
1344 (1934) ; 111 id. 362, 387 (1937) ; 141 id. 1283, 1295 (1942).
70. White Way Sign Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 368 Ill. 428, 14 N. E.
2d 839 (1939). A provision somewhat to this effect is incorporated in § 7 of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act. 2 UNlF. LAWs. ANN. 12 (1922).
71. Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, 109 Va. 382, 63 S. E. 1070 (1909).
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A minority of states have the rule that, as against a subsequent
mortgagee of the land, a prior conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee
who has recorded his conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage in
the personal property records may remove the articles if they are not
paid for."2 This rule, it is submitted, is unsound. It is unreasonable
to ask intending purchasers or mortgagees of land, in addition to
searching the land records, to shoulder the burden of a personal prop-
erty search as to any item that may be installed on the premises."3
Occasionally, in jurisdictions that maintain separate land and
personal property records, a bona fide mortgagee or purchaser of land
is protected against an unfiled conditional sale contract, and refer-
ence is made to the fact that the conditional sale contract was not
recorded in the personal property records.74 The question naturally
arises whether recording of the conditional sale contract in the personal
property records would be regarded as imparting constructive notice
to purchasers and mortgagees of the land. These cases arrive at the
correct result, but the reason assigned for the decision seems unsound.
Recording the contract in the personal property records would make
no difference, since purchasers or mortgagees of land need not, under
the prevailing rule, search those records. Similarly, in all jurisdic-
tions where the Uniform Conditional Sales Act is in force,"5 decisions
protecting a purchaser or mortgagee of land should be based on Section
7,76 the fixture recording provision, and not upon Section 5,77 since
the purpose of the latter provision is to protect purchasers of chattels,
while the purpose of the former provision is to protect purchasers of
land. 8
In all jurisdictions a real estate mortgagee having actual knowl-
edge of the existence of an earlier chattel mortgage or conditional sale
contract takes subject to the chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor's
right of removal. 7  Actual knowledge may be acquired by the mort-
gagee through the mortgagor's answers to questions appearing on the
72. Sword v. Low, 122 11. 487, 13 N. E. 826 (1887); Boergina v. Berry, 96
Wash. 57, 164 Pac. 773 (1917) ; 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1022 (1929) ; 15 WASH. L.
REV. 252, 254 (1940); Note, 13 A. L. R. 448, 484 (1921), supplemented 73 id. 748,
773 (1931); 88 id. 1318, 1344 (1934); 111 id. 362, 387 (1937); 141 id. 1283, 1295
(1942).
73. In re Brownsville Brewing Co., 117 F. 2d 463 (3d Cir. 1941) ; 2A UNiF.
LAWS ANN. 98 (1924); 1 JoNs, CHATTEL MORTGAGES & CONDITIONAL SALES 224
(6th ed. 1933); Note, 15 WASH. L. REv. 252, 255 (1940).
74. Patton v. Phoenix Brick Co., 167 Mo. App. 8, 150 S. W. 1116 (1912).
75. 2 UNiF. LAws ANN. 6 (Supp. 1947).
76. 2 UN F. LAWS ANN. 12 (1922).
77. Ibd. 5.
78. Cf. Kommel v. Herb-Gner Const. Co., 256 N. Y. 333, 176 N. E. 413 (1931).
79. Razatos v. Daniels & Fisher Stores Co., 110 Colo. 105, 131 P. 2d 417 (1942);
King v. Blickfeldt, 111 Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920).
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loan application, through the mortgagee's credit search of the mort-
gagor, or through other sources. A "hireplate" attached to the article
is of no effect as to parties who are unaware of it. 0
B. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE: Where (a) a chattel mortgage
or conditional sale contract antedates the mortgage, and (b) has not
been recorded, and (c) the real estate mortgagee makes the loan in
ignorance of the existence of the chattel mortgage or conditional sale
contract, and (d) the articles so purchased on credit are installed on
mortgaged land in such manner that they would normally be con-
sidered fixtures, in an overwhelming majority of the states, the articles
become subject to the mortgage and are not removable as to the real
estate mortgagee. While the character of property as real or per-
sonal property may be fixed by contract with the owner of the real
estate when the article is put in position, such contract cannot affect
the rights of an innocent real estate mortgagee who has no notice
of the agreement."' The practical reason for this rule is obvious. The
annexed item apparently forms a part of the land. A purchaser or
mortgagee of the land will examine and appraise the land and build-
ings thereon before making his investment. To permit third parties
thereafter to remove portions of the structure by virtue of secret con-
ditional sale contracts or chattel mortgages would upset the most care-
ful calculations and would involve land titles in great confusion. To
insure stability of titles to real estate, purchasers and mortgagees
thereof must be protected against the unrecorded claims of third per-
sons. The rule, then, according to some courts, owes its origin to
the same policy that is expressed in the recording acts.S2  Other courts
say that the real estate mortgagee having been misled and induced
to part with his money on the credit of the property, his equity is
paramount to that of the conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee.83
Where one of two innocent persons must suffer, that one should bear
the loss whose conduct or act placed it in the power of a third party
to impose upon or deceive another.84 A seller who agrees that fixtures
80. Hobson v. Gorringe [1897] 1 Ch. 182.
81. Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Savings Bank 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327
(1890); James Leo Co. v. Jersey City Bill Posting Co., 78 N. J. L. 150, 73 Atl. 1046
(1909); XXth Century Heating and Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp.,
56 Ohio App. 188, 10 N. E. 2d 229 (1937); McCrillis v. Cole, 25 R. I. 156, 55 Atl.
196 (1913); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Fred. W. Wolf Co., 114 Tenn. 255, 86
S. W. 310 (1905) ; Note, 13 A. L. R. 448, 478 (1921), supplemented 73 id. 748, 767
(1931); 88 id. 1318, 1338 (1934); 111 id. 366, 384 (1937); 141 id. 1283, 1293
(1942).
82. Rowand v. Anderson, 33 Kan. 264, 6 Pac. 255 (1885); Muir v. Jones, 23
Ore. 332, 31 Pac. 646 (1892); Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Fred. W. Wolf Co.,
114 Tenn. 255, 86 S. W. 310 (1904).
83. Davenport v. Shonts, 43 Vt. 546 (1871).
84. Note, 15 WASH. L. REv. 252, 253 (1940).
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shall be converted in all outward appearance into real property assumes
the risk of their being sold as such, and it would be contrary to justice
to allow the seller to save himself by casting the consequences upon
the purchaser of the realty, 5 and as to third parties, the intention
evidenced by the conduct of the parties, not the secret intention, must
govern8 '
It is unfortunate that the theory upon which protection is extended
the innocent purchaser or mortgagee has not been worked out with
greater precision. Normally, an innocent purchaser of land draws
upon two main sources of protection: the recording acts and the
equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. The protection afforded by
the recording acts is defined by statute and is aimed against unrecorded
documents entitled to recording in the land records, such as deeds
and mortgages. Inasmuch as the recording acts afford no protection
against documents or interests not entitled to recording in the land
records, such statutes do not protect an innocent purchaser or mort-
gagee against interests not within the statutory scope, such as result-
ing trusts.87 Equity, however, bridges this gap by protecting the
innocent purchaser against the secret equity.88 If we attempt solution
of the problem on the theory that the conditional sale contract is
entitled to recording in the personal property records, we are met with
the rule generally prevailing that purchasers and mortgagees of realty
are not required to search the personal property records. Section 7
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides escape from the dilemma
by permitting and requiring the conditional sale contract to be recorded
in the land records. But in jurisdictions where the act is not in
force this important rule rests upon an unsatisfactory foundation. This
is so unless it can be argued that express statutory provision is not
needed for filing in the land records a statement comparable to that
required by Section 7 of the Uniform Act to the effect that certain
described articles to be installed on certain described real estate shall
not become part of the real estate until fully paid for. 9 It is not clear
at present whether the rule is subject to the qualifications applicable
under the recording acts. In some jurisdictions, for example, a grantee
85. Knowlton v. Johnson, 37 Mich. 47 (1877).
86. Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 23 N. E. 327
(1890)
87. East St. Louis Lumber Co. v. Schnipper, 310 Ill. 150, 141 N. E. 542 (1923).
88. 3 Scor, TRUSTs 2173 (1939).
89. White Way Sign Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 368 Ill. 482, 14 N. E
2d 839 (1938). An instrument executed by a real estate mortgagee assenting to con-
ditional vendor's removal of articles in the event of default in the installment pay-
ments is a document entitled to recording. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Savings
& Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N. E. 2d 273 (1939); Central Lithograph Co. v.
Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316 Pa. 300, 175 Atl. 697 (1934).
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in a quitclaim deed is not considered a bona fide purchaser entitled
to the benefit of the recording laws.90 It seems probable that in
evolving the rule in question the courts have looked to the recording
laws only for policy and analogy and do not feel bound by the technical
limitations applicable to the recording acts.
The protection afforded by the rule extends to articles that would
normally be considered fixtures as between buyer and seller of land,
since it is on this basis that the mortgagee makes his appraisal.9 The
fact that the articles can be easily removed without damage to the
building is immaterial. 2  The test must necessarily be an objective
one, since the real estate mortgagee cannot be expected to know the
secret purpose expressed in the unrecorded document. External in-
dications must supply the sole criterion.9"
C. THE NEW YORK RULE: It has occasionally been held that a
bona fide real estate mortgagee will not be protected against prior un-
recorded conditional sale contracts.94 This was the early rule in New
York.95 Taking advantage of the ambiguity of the intention test
of Teaff v. Hewitt, 6 New York developed its own test, under which
the intention of the parties to the conditional sale was of decisive
importance. As title was retained in the conditional vendor, it fol-
lowed that the chattel remained his personal property and could not
become a fixture. Hence, the reservation of title was valid even as
against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of the land.
97
Since this rule worked great hardship upon innocent purchasers and
mortgagees of land, legislation was enacted in 1884 providing for
the filing of conditional sale contracts in the personal property records.9"
Under this statute, a bona fide purchaser or mortgagee of land was
protected against unfiled conditional sale contracts.99 It was evident,
90. Messenger v. Peter, 129 Mich. 93, 88 N. W. 209 (1901); Partridge v.
Hemenway, 89 Mich. 454, 50 N. W. 1084 (1891) ; 3 PomEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
51 (5th ed. 1941).
91. Note, 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 77, 78 (1941).
92. Wood Hydraulic Hoist & Body Co. v. Norton, 269 Mich. 341, 257 N. W.
836 (1934).
93. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Savings & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St 48,
19 N. E. 2d 273 (1939) ; Cohen v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 51 R. I. 153,
152 AtI. 693 (1930).
94. 1 JONES, MoRTGAGES 713 (8th ed. 1928).
95. Ibid.
96. 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
97. Godard v. Gould, 14 Barb. 662 (N. Y. 1853); Bogert, The Evolution of
Conditional Sales Law in New York, 8 CoRN. L. Q. 303, 314 (1923); Note, 27
B. U. L. REv. 317, 319 (1947). See also Lawton Pressed Brick & Tile Co. v. Ross-
Kellar T. P. B. M. Co., 33 Okla. 59, 124 Pac. 43 (1912).
98. Bogert, supra note 97, at 314-316.
99. Ibid.
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however, that the protection afforded purchasers and mortgagees of
land was still inadequate, since it was manifestly unfair to require a
prospective purchaser or mortgagee of land to search the personal
property records as to every detachable article in the building."'
Hence in 1904 the law was amended to require that conditional sales of
articles attached or to be attached to buildings contain a brief descrip-
tion of the real estate and that they be filed in the land records. 10 1
Legislation of similar character was later enacted in Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Oregon.102
D. THE RULE UNDER THE UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT:
This fixture recording device of the New York law became Sec-
tion 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Under this section
recording of the contract and statement imparts constructive notice
to all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees of the real estate,'0 3 and
bona fide purchasers and mortgagees of land are protected against con-
ditional sale contracts not filed in accordance with the statute. 0 4 Mere
filing of the conditional sale contract without the accompanying state-
ment required by the act is not sufficient.'0 5
Under this act it is clear that a real estate mortgagee need not
search the personal property records in order to obtain a first lien
upon articles that are deemed fixtures under the rules prevailing in
his jurisdiction. It was an important objective of this legislation to
relieve purchasers and the mortgagees of land of the necessity of
making this search, while affording conditional vendors a means of
protecting their rights by filing in the land records. As will presently
appear, however, this highly desirable result was not wholly achieved.
Under the common law rule, protection is extended the real estate
mortgagee only as to articles that become fixtures. Chattels installed
on the mortgaged premises but not technically fixtures are removable
as against the subsequent real estate mortgagee.'0 8 This rule occasions
difficulty and hardship in jurisdictions like New York, where articles
elsewhere regarded as fixtures are treated as "inherent chattels." 10'
The difficulty is not removed by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Treat v. Nowell, 37 Ariz. 290, 294 Pac. 273 (1930).
104. Kobler Co., Inc. v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928) ; Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co. v. Franzke-Scbiffman Co., 211 Wis. 659, 248 N. W. 178 (1933).
105. Capital Motion Picture Supply Corp. v. Mapes-Bergen Amusements, Inc.,
117 N. J. L. 185, 187 Atl. 161 (1936).
106. Note, 20 B. U. L. REv. 370, 374 (1940).
107. Kleps, Uniformity Versus Uniform Legislation, 24 CoRx. L. Q. 394, 409
(1939).
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since Section 7 of that Act refers to articles that are affixed to realty
"as to become part thereof," and therefore has reference to articles
that would have become fixtures except for the provisions of the con-
ditional sale contract.'-0  Hence a real estate mortgagee must either
make a search of the personal property records or determine at his
peril whether or not articles installed on the mortgaged premises are
technically fixtures.
The purchaser of a fixture is in somewhat the same dilemma.
If he is sure the article is a true fixture, he need only search the land
records for conditional sale contracts recorded in compliance with Sec-
tion 7.' °9 If, however, he is in doubt, he must also search the personal
property records, where conditional sale contracts of chattels will be
found.
E. THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE: In an effort to relieve pur-
chasers of land and real estate mortgagees of the risk and burden of
determining whether articles installed in the mortgaged premises are
true fixtures, Massachusetts has adopted a law which protects a sub-
sequent purchaser or real estate mortgagee against prior conditional
sale contracts of certain specified articles "wrought into or attached
to the real estate, whether they are fixtures at common law or not,"
unless the conditional sale contract is filed in the registry of deeds. 1°
The statute is restricted to the articles specified therein "' and affords
no protection to a purchaser or mortgagee of land who has actual
notice of the prior conditional sale contract."' Legislation having the
same general purpose as the Massachusetts legislation has been passed
in Washington." 8 The objective is laudable, but whether the desired
result has been achieved remains a matter for conjecture. It seems
probable that a substantial volume of litigation may be needed to bring
into somewhat sharper focus the rather nebulous statutory concept of
articles "wrought into or attached to the real estate."
F. OTHER PROBLEmS ARISING UNDER THE FIXTURE RECORDING
LAWS: It should be pointed out that under the fixture recording laws,
if a conditional vendor entertains any doubt as to whether or not his
article will, on installation, become a fixture, he must, to be certain
108. Kleps, op. cit. supra note 1; Note, 20 B. U. L. REv. 370, 375 (1940).
109. Kohler Co., Inc. v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928).
110. Gar Wood Industries v. Colonial Homes, 305 Mass. 41, 24 N. E. 2d 767
(1940) ; Note, 20 B. U. L. R~v. 370 (1940).
111. Note, 27 B. U. L. REv. 317, 318 (1947).
112. Lawrenson v. Worcester Lunch Car & Carriage Mfg. Co., 300 Mass. 543,
15 N. E. 2d 978 (1938).
113. Note, 13 WASH. L. REv. 46, 54 (1938).
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of protection, file his contract in both the personal property and real
property records." 4 If the articles are not technically fixtures, record-
ing in the land records will be without legal effect, and if the articles
are fixtures, recording in the personal property records is likewise
ineffective.
Under Section 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, removal
of a fixture is not permitted against a real estate mortgagee who has
not consented thereto if removal would entail material injury to the
freehold."' The ambiguous character of the statutory test has given
rise to much litigation and controversy.
Since Section 7 of the Uniform Act makes the conditional sale
contract an instrument entitled and required to be recorded in the land
records, no doubt the usual rules of recording law are applicable to this
document. For example, if a real estate mortgagee who has actual
notice of a prior unrecorded conditional sale contract assigns the
mortgage to an assignee who purchases in ignorance of the conditional
sale, the assignee would be protected." 6
VI. PRIOITIES BETWEEN REAL ESTATE MORTGAGEE AND LESSEE OF
LEASE ANTEDATING MORTGAGE
In the absence of a subordination clause in the lease, the rights
of a lessee under a lease that antedates a real estate mortgage are
paramount to the rights of the mortgagee. Hence, as against the
mortgagee, the lessee may remove any trade fixtures which would
be removable as against the mortgagor, if the lease does not restrict
this right." 7 Normally no question of recording will arise in such
a situation, since the lessee's possession will impart constructive notice
of his rights."'
VII. RIGHTS OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGEE IN ARTICLES ANNEXED
AFTER RECORDING OF MORTGAGE
A. As BETWEEN MORTGAGEE AND OWNER OF MORTGAGED
PREMISES: As a rule, an owner of unencumbered land may make a
separate sale or mortgage of articles previously annexed to the land
and such sale has the effect of rendering such articles personalty
although in no wise physically severed." 9 However, as to encumbered
114. Kleps, Uniformity Versus Uniform Legislation, 24 CORN. L. Q. 394 (1939).
115. As to what constitutes material injury to the freehold, see Part IX.
116. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES 826 (8th ed. 1928).
117. Id. at 723.
118. Sweet v. Henry, 175 N. Y. 268, 67 N. E. 574 (1903).
119. Soule v. First Nat. Bank of Ft. Smith, 202 Ark. 326, 150 S. W. 2d 204
(1941).
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premises the rule is subject to the limitation that fixtures installed
by the landowner on mortgaged premises become subject to the lien
of the existing mortgage. 2° The character of the article as a fixture
is determined from external indications, unaffected by the existence of
the prior lien on the premises,' 2 ' though there is greater tendency to
resolve doubts against the mortgagee than in the situation where the
article was annexed prior to the execution of the mortgage, for in the
latter case it is likely that the article entered into the consideration of
the mortgagee in estimating the value of his security.'22 If the article
has been purchased under a conditional sale contract it becomes a fix-
ture subject only to the conditional vendor's rights.'
23
Unlike trade fixtures installed by a tenant, trade fixtures installed
by the landowner are not removable as against a prior mortgagee.'
24
Where by the specific language of a real estate mortgage the mort-
gagee's lien extends to chattels installed by the landowner after the
recording of the mortgage, such language will be given effect as be-
tween the mortgagee and the landowner.
25
B. As BETWEEN MORTGAGEE AND LESSEE UNDER LEASE JUNIOR
TO MORTGAGE: Some authorities lay down the rule that inasmuch as
the mortgagor cannot confer a greater right upon another than he
possesses himself, fixtures annexed by a tenant of the mortgagor under
a lease executed subsequently to the execution of the mortgage pass
by a foreclosure sale to the purchaser at such sale, and cannot be re-
moved by such a tenant.' 26  However, in the majority of states, con-
siderations of logic and consistency are outweighed by the strong
policy in favor of the free removal of a tenant's trade fixtures, and the
120. Williams v. Chicago Exhibition Co., 188 Ill. 19, 58 N. E. 611 (1900);
Snedeker v. Warring, 12 N. Y. 170 (1854); Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178
Va. 223, 16 S. E. 2d 345 (1941) ; Note, 41 A. L. R. 601 (1926), supplemented 88
A. L. R. 1114 (1934); 99 A. L. R. 144 (1935).
121. Bell v. Bank of Perris, 52 Cal. App. 2d 66, 125 P. 2d 829 (1942) ; Danville
Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16 S. E. 2d 345 (1941).
122. Planters Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S. C. 16, 30, 128 S. E. 876,
881 (1925); 1 JONES, MORTGAGES 706 (8th ed. 1928). The argument for extending
the mortgage lien to articles affixed after the execution of the mortgage is well stated
in Niles, The Intention Test in the Law of Fixtures, 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 66, 73-74
(1934).
123. Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. v. Lauchli, 118 F. 2d 607 (8th Cir. 1941);
Bell v. Bank of Perris, 52 Cal. App. 2d 66, 125 P. 2d 829 (1942).
124. Kelly v. Austin, 46 Ill. 156 (1867) ; Bowen v. Wood, 35 Ind. 268 (1871);
Tyler v. Hayward, 235 Mich. 674. 209 N. W. 801 (1926) ; Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb.
784, 238 N. W. 659 (1931); Note, 41 A. L. R. 601, 614 (1926), supplemented 88
A. L. R. 1114, 1117 (1934); 99 A. L. R. 144, 145 (1935).
125. General Synod of the Reformed Church in America v. Bonac Realty Corp.,
297 N. Y. 841, 75 N. E. 2d 841 (1947). See, however, Friedman, The Scope of Mort-
gage Liens on Fixtures and Persoiwl Property in New York, 7 FORD. L. REv. 331, 342
et seq. (1938).
126. EWELL, FiXTures 412 (2d ed. 1905).
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landowner's tenant is permitted to remove his trade fixtures even as
against a prior real estate mortgagee. 27 Removal is not permitted.
however, where it would entail material injury to the mortgaged
premises, thereby impairing the mortgagee's security. 2 ' In determin-
ing whether or not removal of such trade fixtures would materially
injure the premises, courts are, in some states, influenced by the fact
that the article installed by the tenant replaced one that was on the prem-
ises when he took possession. Under this view, if a tenant substituted a
new fixture for one on the premises at the time of taking possession,
and this latter has been injured or permanently removed, he must not
remove the substituted article, since the effect would be to leave the
premises in worse condition than when he took the lease.129 Other
courts, however, will permit removal under such circumstances. The
fact that the lessee has actual knowledge of the mortgage has oc-
casionally resulted in a holding in favor of the mortgagee. 30
C. As BETWEEN REAL ESTATE MORTGAGEE AND SUBSEQUENT
CONDITIONAL VENDOR OR CHATTEL MORTGAGEE. (MAJORITY
VIEW) : There is a sharp conflict in the cases as to the rights of
a prior real estate mortgagee in articles installed on the mortgaged
premises under a conditional sale contract or chattel mortgage. Under
the rule supported by the weight of authority, a chattel mortgagee or
conditional vendor may remove such articles in case of default in pay-
ment on the theory that since the articles were installed after execution
of the mortgage, the real estate mortgagee has parted with nothing
in reliance on the subsequently installed articles.3 ' The rule operates
despite the fact that the chattel mortgage or conditional sale contract
has not been recorded as required by law, since recording is required
127. Kelly v. Austin, 46 Ill. 146 (1867) ; Old Line'Life Ins. Co. v. Hawn, 225
Wis. 627, 275 N. W. 542 (1937) ; Standard Oil Co. v. LaCrosse Super Auto Service,
217 Wis. 237, 258 N. W. 791 (1935) ; Note, 41 A. L. R. 601, 616 (1926), supplemented
88 A. L. R. 1114, 1119 (1934); 99 A. L. R. 144, 146 (1935).
128. Broaddus v. Smith, 121 Ala. 335, 26 So. 34 (1898); Williams v. Chicago
Exhibition Co., 188 Ill. 19, 58 N. E. 611 (1900).
129. McHale v. Rosenblatt, 56 R. I. 120, 184 AtI. 172 (1936); Rosenblum v.
Terry Carpenter, 174 P. 2d 142 (Wyo. 1946).
130. McHale v. Rosenblatt, 56 R. I. 120, 184 Atl. 172 (1936).
131. Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 14 Atl. 279 (1888) (the leading case);
Detroit Steel Co. v. Sisterville Brewing Co., 233 U. S. 712 (1914) (tanks necessary
to operation of brewery); Woodliff v. Citizens Bldg. & Realty Co., 240 Mich. 413,
215 N. W. 343 (1927) (elevator in apartment building); Swift Lumber & Fuel Co.
v. Elwanger, 127 Neb. 740, 256 N. W. 875 (1934) (boiler, oil burner and tank);
Note, 13 A. L. R. 448, 461 (1921), supplemented 73 A. L. R. 748, 755 (1931); 88
A. L. R. 1318, 1324 (1934); 111 A. L. R. 362, 372 (1942); 141 id. 1283, 1288.
Occasionally the reason assigned is that the mortgage lien attaches only to the
mortgagor's equity in the article. Hurxthal v. Hurxthal, 45 W. Va. 584, 32 S. E.
237 (1898).
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for the protection of subsequent purchasers of the chattels, not prior
mortgagees, 13 2 nor is the operation of the rule affected by the fact
that the real estate mortgage contains an after-acquired property
clause. 3s The rule is of common law origin, and it was not the in-
tention of the drafters of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act to change
it." 4 The same rule is applicable to a vendor in the enforcement of
his vendor's lien, for his equities are like those of a prior mortgagee. 35
However, removal will not be permitted where such removal would
entail material injury to the freehold.'
An important economic consequence of the majority rule (and
doubtless this factor accounts for the widespread acceptance of the
rule) is the resulting encouragement of credit sales of fixtures.
3 7
Evidently this argument weighs heavily with the courts, for there are
many dependent upon credit sales as a means of equipping and start-
ing a business, for example the small grocer and restaurant keeper;
and then there are those wage earners who are themselves a poor
financial risk without some security, and who depend upon the sale on
credit to buy furnaces or refrigerators. 3 8  A further consequence is
the injecting of an element of uncertainty into mortgage lending, since
the majority rule provides no effective method by which a mortgagee
can protect himself against subsequent conditional sales. No doubt
in a majority of cases a landowner who encounters financial adversity
will default in both his mortgage and installment purchase payments.
Faced with the threat of removal of needed items such as necessary
machines, furnaces, oil burners, and elevators, the real estate mort-
gagee, who is already bearing the expense and possible loss incident to
a mortgage foreclosure, will settle with the credit vendor, the result
being to shift to the mortgagee's shoulders an unanticipated additional
burden. In support of the majority rule it can be argued that such
a foreclosing mortgagee takes over a building with equipment newer
and presumably better than that installed at the time the mortgage loan
was made.
132. American Laundry Machine Co. v. Larson, 217 Wis. 208, 257 N. W. 608
(1934).
133. Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637 (1914); 1 JONES, MORTGAGES 714 (8th ed.
1928). The effect of the after-acquired property clause on after-acquired chattels in-
stalled in the premises is discussed in Friedman, The Scope of Mortgage Liens on Fix-
tures and Personal Property in New York, 7 FORD. L. REv. 331, 335 et seq. (1938).
134. Kleps, Uniformity Versus Uniform Legislation, 24 CORN. L. Q. 394, 405
(1939).
135. Harris v. Hackley, 127 Mich. 46, 86 N. W. 389 (1901).
136. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Franzke-Schiffman Realty Co., 211 Wis.
659, 248 N. W. 178 (1933). See Part IX.
137. Note, 22 CORN. L. Q. 421, 426 (1937).
138. Ibid.
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D. As BETWEEN REAL ESTATE MORTGAGEE AND SUBSEQUENT
CONDITIONAL VENDOR OR CHATTEL MORTGAGEE (MINORITY VIEW) :
Under the minority or Massachusetts rule, articles installed on mort-
gaged premises by a conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee are not
removable as against such real estate mortgagee. 3 9  The Massachu-
setts rule finds its technical justification in the argument that since
the mortgagor cannot, in his own favor, withdraw articles annexed
from the operation of the mortgage, he cannot do so in favor of
another.140 The economic justification advanced for the rule is that,
as the mortgagee may suffer by the depreciation of the property arising
from fluctuations in value, from accidents, and from neglect, so he
should be benefited by its appreciation, whether the same arises from
the proper cultivation and improvement of the property or from any
other cause.'41 Where the real estate mortgagee consents to the con-
ditional sale, he thereby consents to the exercise of the credit vendor's
right of removal."
It is not singular in this troubled field that courts, while paying
lip service to the locally prevailing rules, have yielded in some measure
to the logic of competing doctrines. This tendency has been quite
pronounced in the Massachusetts decisions. It has been held in that
jurisdiction that the fact that articles were bought on conditional sale,
even if unknown to the mortgagee, has some tendency to show an
intention that the article retain its chattel character.143  Similar expres-
sions will be found in other jurisdictions that profess to follow the
Massachusetts rule.'44 There are several reasons why this view is not
tenable. In the first place, the conditional sale contemplates removal
only in the event of default, and it is plain that the conditional pur-
chaser intends to discharge his debt to the conditional vendor. 45  In
the second place, the mortgagee is not party to the conditional sale
contract, and under Massachusetts doctrine, ought not to be bound
by it.140  Finally, Massachusetts is committed to the view that the
intention deducible from the acts of the annexor, not his secret inten-
tion, controls as to third parties "who have or may acquire interests
139. Waverly Co-Operative Bank v. Haner, 273 Mass. 477, 173 N. E. 699 (1930);
Notes, 13 A. L. R. 448, 471 (1921) ; 73 A. L. R. 748, 763 (1931) ; 88 A. L. R. 1318,
1335 (1934) ; 111 A. L. R. 362, 382 (1937) ; 141 A. L. R. 1283, 1292 (1942).
140. Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray 533 (Mass. 1860).
141. Pennsylvania Chocolate Co. v. Hershey Bros., 316 Pa. 292, 299, 175 AtI. 694,
697 (1934).
142. Hawkins v. Hersey, 86 Me. 394, 30 Atl. 14 (1894).
143. Medford Trust Co. v. Priggen Steel Co., 273 Mass. 349, 174 N. E. 126
(1930); Note, 27 B. U. L. REv. 317 (1947).
144. Cumberland County Power & Light Co. v. Hotel Ambassador, 134 Me. 153,
183 Atl. 132 (1936).
145. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kimball, 163 Ore. 31, 94 P. 2d 1101 (1939);
Note, 27 B. U. L. RZEv. 317, 321 (1947).
146. Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray 533 (Mass. 1860).
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in the property." 147 More recently the Massachusetts court has in-
dicated a preference for the objective test of intention in this situa-
tion. 4  As to third parties, the test clearly should be an objective
one.
149
It is evident that when the Massachusetts rule jurisdictions admit
evidence of secret intent as against a prior real estate mortgagee
they are simply expressing dissatisfaction with the Massachusetts
rule.' 50 In some instances this dissatisfaction has been more overtly
expressed.'
E. WHERE PROCEEDS OF LOAN ARE DISBURSED AFTER OR CON-
TEMPORANEOUSLY WITH INSTALLATION: Where machinery for opera-
tion of a brewery was installed under a conditional sale contract sub-
sequently to the execution of a mortgage trust deed on the brewery
premises, but the proceeds of the mortgage loan were not disbursed un-
til later, it was held that the mortgage lien must be treated as coming
into existence subsequently to the conditional sale, and therefore the
situation was governed by the rule protecting subsequent mortgagees
against prior conditional sale contracts. 52 Where the mortgage loan
payout takes place contemporaneously with the installation of the
articles, the mortgagee is likewise protected.: 83  A mortgagee who pays
out his funds as construction goes forward may legitimately assume that
articles contemporaneously installed constitute parts of the mortgage
security. The rule is the same under the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act.
54
Liberal recourse to the sound and sensible views announced in
these cases would doubtless have often avoided the absurd and harsh
results reached by blind application of the majority rule.
147. Hopewell Mills v. Taunton Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 519, 522, 23 N. E.
327, 330 (1890).
148. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth Mortgage & Loan Co., 276
Mass. 335, 177 N. E. 88 (1931) ; General Heat & Appliance Co. v. Goodwin, 316
Mass. 3, 54 'N. E. 2d 676 (1944).
149. Note, 27 B. U. L. REv. 317, 323 (1947).
150. E. g., Medford Trust Co. v. Priggin Steel Garage Co., 273 Mass. 349, 174
N. E. 126 (1930) (steel garage on a concrete mounting held not a fixture).
151. McHale v. Rosenblatt, 56 R. I. 120, 184 Atl. 172 (1936) (expressing
preference for the rule of Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 14 At. 279 (1888),
note 131 supra).
152. Wade v. Donau Brewing Co., 10 Wash. 284, 38 Pac. 1009 (1894).
153. Swift Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Elwanger, 127 Neb. 740, 256 N. W. 875
(1934) ; King v. Blickfeldt, 111 Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920) ; cf. Allis-Chalmers
Co. v. Atlantic, 164 Iowa 8, 144 N. W. 346 (1913).
154. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Cosmopolitan Club, 111 N. J. Eq. 277, 162
AtI. 396 (Ch., 1932); Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 343,
182 N. E. 10 (1932).
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F. As BETWEEN REAL ESTATE MORTGAGEE AND SUBSEQUENT
CONDITIONAL VENDOR OR CHATTEL MORTGAGEE AFTER FORECLOSURE
SALE: If a real estate mortgagee buys the mortgaged land at his own
foreclosure sale, and at that time remains unaware of the rights of
the chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor, it has been held that
he is entitled to protection, under the rule that a subsequent pur-
chaser is protected against a prior unrecorded chattel mortgage or
conditional sale contract, 55 but most courts continue to treat a mort-
gagee who has purchased at his own foreclosure sale as a prior
mortgagee rather than as a subsequent purchaser. 5 6 However, an
innocent third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale will be pro-
tected. 5 ' This is in harmony with the universally accepted view that
a purchaser at a judicial sale is entitled to protection under the record-
ing acts, 58 and is unquestionably the correct view under the fixture
recording provision of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Occa-
sionally a purchaser at an execution or judicial sale has been denied
protection, without, however, any sound reason being advanced for
such a view.1 9
VIII. MORTGAGEE'S REMEDIES AGAINST THIRD PERSONS' 6 ° FOR
REMOVAL OF FIXTURES
A. SUITS FOR DAMAGES: Title States: In strict title states, a
mortgagee may maintain an action to recover damages from third per-
sons for any injury to the mortgaged property, as by the removal of
fixtures.' 6 ' In these jurisdictions a mortgagee is so far the owner in
fee of the mortgaged estate that, if any part of it is wrongfully severed
and converted into personalty by the mortgagor, the mortgagee's inter-
est is not divested, but he remains the owner of the personalty, and may
follow and recover it or its value of any *one who has converted it to
his own use. 6 2 The mortgagee's damages are measured by the extent
155. Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Savings & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19
N. E. 2d 273 (1939).
156. Viking Equipment Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 232 Ala. 543, 168 So. 566
(1936) ; Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Eyanson, 113 Ind. App. 52, 46 N. E. 2d 711
(1943).
157. Kohler Co., Inc. v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1928).
158. Weir v. Snider Saw Mill Co., 88 Ohio St. 424, 103 N. E. 133 (1913).
159. Yater v. Mullen, 24 Ind. 277 (1865).
160. As to the mortgagee's remedies against the mortgagor or his grantee, see
Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 132 N. J. Eq. 97, 26 A. 2d 865 (Ct. Err. & App., 1942).
161. Byrom v. Chapin, 113 Mass. 308 (1873); Howe v. Wadsworth, 59 N. H.
397 (1879); Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Jones, 211 N. C. 317, 190 S. E.
479 (1937).
162. Burrill Nat. Bank v. Edminister, 119 Me. 367, 111 Atl. 423 (1920); Delano
v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365, 92 N. E. 500 (1910); Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491
(1879).
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of the injury to the property.'63 His right of action does not depend
upon, and his 'damages are not to be measured by, proof of insufficiency
of the remaining security, nor is he obliged to accept what remains
as satisfaction pro tanto of his debt at any valuation whatever. 64
He is entitled to the full benefit of the entire mortgaged estate for the
full payment of the entire debt, hence the measure of his damages is
the full value of the fixtures removed.'65 Since the mortgagee's action
is based on title, the defense of bona fide purchase for value is not
available, the applicable principle being that which permits recovery
of stolen property even from an innocent purchaser. 66 Since in title
states the mortgagee has the legal title accompanied by the right of
possession, he may maintain trespass q. c. f.,' 67 trover, 68 trespass
d. b. a., 69 waste, 70 or, as will hereafter appear, replevin.''
The Majority Rule: Most of the states, including some title states
and most lien theory states, allow the mortgagee to maintain an action
against a third party for impairment of his security occasioned by
removal of fixtures.12  For injury to his security the mortgagee may
have an action, analogous to an action on the case, since the mortgagee
has no property in the severed article sufficient to maintain trover or
trespass. 73 However, it has been held that even in lien states a mort-
gagee in possession may maintain an action of trespass as though title
were vested in him unconditionally.
7 4
Limitations on the Right of Recovery: The cases have marked
out certain limits on the right of the mortgagee to recover damages.
Where the mortgagor is permitted to retain possession, there is an
163. Byrom v. Chapin, 113 Mass. 308 (1873).
164. Ibid.
165. Fitzgerald v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 176 Ark. 64, 38 S. W. 2d 30
(1928); King v. Bangs, 120 Mass. 514 (1876); Gooding v. Shea, 103 Mass. 360
(1869).
166. Burpee v. Athens Production Credit Ass'n., 65 Ga. App. 102, 15 S. E. 2d
526 (1941).
167. Burrill Nat. Bank v. Edminister, 119 Me. 367, 111 Atl. 423 (1920).
168. Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491 (1879).
169. Frothingham v. McKusick, 24 Me. 403 (1844).
170. Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365, 92 N. E. 500 (1910).
171. See cases cited infra Part VIII, B.
172. Hummer v. R. C. Huffman Const. Co., 63 F. 2d 372 (7th Cir. 1933);
Easton v. Ash, 18 Cal. 2d 530, 116 P. 2d 433 (1941); Arnold v. Broad, 15 Colo.
App. 389, 62 Pac. 577 (1900) ; Matthews v. Silsby Bros., 198 Iowa 1392, 201 N. W. 94
(1924) ; City of Toledo v. Brown, 130 Ohio St. 513, 200 N. E. 750 (1936); Planter's
Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S. C. 16, 128 S. E. 876 (1925); Note, 37
A. L. R. 1120 (1925).
173. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Davis, 228 Ala. 85, 152 So. 226
(1934); Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556 (1843); Peterson v. Clark, 15 Johns. 205
(N. Y. 1818).
174. Kiernan v. Jersey City, 50 N. J. L. 246, 13 Atl. 170 (1888); Johnson v.
Pacific Land Co., 84 Ore. 356, 164 Pac. 564 (1917).
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implied license to do any act usual and proper in the course of good
husbandry and the mortgagee can maintain no action against third
parties for damages for articles so removed.' This rule, it has been
said, may well apply to minerals, timber and the like, which are in-
tended for consumption, since otherwise the very means necessary for
payment of the mortgage debt would be taken from the debtor and
prudent purchasers would be reluctant to deal with him,178 but it has
been denied that the rule applies to sales of fixtures, for it is not by
sale of the mortgaged property piecemeal that its profits are to be
derived. 17 7  However, a strong case can be made for denying recovery
even in the case of the sale of a fixture.
"Mortgagors in possession of estates subject to mortgages past
due are constantly, for purposes of repair or profit, detaching and
removing buildings, fixtures, fences, trees and other similar articles
without intending to impair, or in fact impairing, the substantial rights
of the mortgagee. If for every such removal the occupants and those
into whose possession the detached articles come, are liable in trover
or replevin, at the instance of parties whose real rights have not been
infringed, the privileges of landowners are less than they are generally
esteemed, and less than they need be for the purposes of justice." 178
If this last quotation is to be taken at face value, innocent third
parties dealing with the mortgagor should be protected, and it has
so been held. 9  Viewed in this light, the question presents an aspect
of the important problem of the extent to which a court will protect
innocent third persons dealing with the mortgagor, a question discussed
elsewhere.8 " Much the same implication is present in the cases con-
fining recovery to instances of willful and fraudulent injury.'
In states other than strict title theory states, there is disagreement
as to the mortgagee's right to sue for damages prior to the ascertain-
ment of a deficiency by foreclosure sale. 8" There is also a diversity of
opinion as to the proper measure of damages.1'8
175. Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491 (1879) ; See Note, 57 A. L. R. 451 (1928).
176. Angler v. Agnew, 98 Pa. 587 (1881). See Note, 57 A. L. R. 451 (1928).
177. Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. 42 (1863).
178. Kircher v. Schalk, 39 N. J. L. 335, 339 (1877).
179. McKelvey v. Creevey, 72 Conn. 464, 45 At1. 4 (1900).
180. See Part VIII, E.
181. Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110 (1850) ; Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio 232
(N. Y. 1846).
182. See Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245, 22 Pac. 184 (1889);
Arnold v. Broad, 15 Colo. App. 389, 62 Pac. 577 (1900); Taylor v. McConnell, 53
Mich. 587 (1884); Toledo v. Brown, 130 Ohio St. 513, 200 N. E. 750 (1936);
Bowden v. Bridgman, 141 S. W. 1043 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
183. See Hummer v. R. C. Huffman Const. Co., 63 F. 2d 372 (7th Cir. 1933);
Arnold v. Broad, 15 Colo. App. 389, 62 Pac. 577 (1900); Elvins v. Del. & Ati. Tel.
Co., 63 N. J. L. 243, 43 Atl. 903 (1889) ; Van Pelt. v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110 (1850);
Note, 10 TEx. L. REv. 477 (1931-32).
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Occasional decisions will be found denying the mortgagee's right
to recover damages against third persons for removal of fixtures, on
the ground that the appropriate remedy for such removal is by injunc-
tion.8 Conversely, it has been held that the very fact that a court
of equity will interfere by way of injunction in such cases stamps the
severance as a wrong to the mortgagee, and that he should not be
denied the right to recover damages merely because his action was not
brought until after the wrong had been committed. 5 One may well
ask whether diligence in plundering the mortgaged premises is the kind
of diligence courts ought to reward. On the eve of default, the mort-
gagor is often tempted to salvage what he can by stripping the premises
bare, and it is unlikely that he will communicate his intentions in this
regard to the mortgagee. To limit the mortgagee to an injunction
suit is to deprive him of an adequate remedy.
B. SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF SEVERED FIXTURES: Title States:
In title states, a mortgagee suing to recover possession of a severed
fixture enjoys the advantages afforded him by the title doctrine. He is
so far the owner in fee of the mortgaged estate that, if any part of it is
wrongfully severed and converted into personalty by the mortgagor,
the mortgagee's interest is not divested; he remains the owner of the
personalty and may follow and recover it.'
However, where the mortgagor is permitted to retain possession,
there is an implied license to do any act usual and proper in the course
of good husbandry, and the mortgagee cannot maintain an action
against third parties for articles so removed.'
Other States: In jurisdictions other than strict title jurisdictions,
there is an absence of agreement as to the mortgagee's right to follow
severed fixtures. It has been held that a mortgagee may recover a
lathe sold by the mortgagor to a purchaser and removed by the latter
from the mortgaged premises, and in support of this result it was
argued that the purchaser must take notice of the mortgage, for all
purchasers take the risk of assuming the title of their vendors.' 8
184. Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556 (1843); Tomlinson v. Thompson, 27 Kan.
70 (1882).
185. Jones v. Costigan, 12 Wis. 677, 683 (1860).
186. Greenwald v. Graham, 100 Fla. 818, 130 So. 608 (1930) (case involved
trust deed, which is regarded in Florida as vesting legal title); Burpee v. Athens
Production Credit Assn., 65 Ga. App. 102, 15 S. E. 2d 526 (1941) (case involved
loan deed, which is regarded in Georgia as vesting legal title); Mosher v. Vehue,
77 Me. 169 (1885) ; Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491 (1879) ; Howe v. Wadsworth,
59 N. H. 397 (1879).
187. Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491 (1879).
188. Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. 42 (1863).
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Cases involving removal of coal and timber were distinguished on the
ground that these are intended for consumption, but in the case of a
factory or other building, it is by the use of it as it is, and not by its
consumption or its sale piecemeal that all its profits are to be derived.
The latter argument was expressly rejected in Kircher v. Schalk,'
where the court held that a mortgagee was not entitled to maintain
replevin for a steam engine severed from the mortgaged premises."' °
Precisely the same view was later taken in Connecticut. There,
after default, the mortgagor sold the furnace of the mortgaged house,
and the purchaser removed the furnace from the premises. It was held
that the mortgagee was not entitled to maintain replevin. 9' The
court fundamentally assumed a lien position, preferring to regard the
mortgagor as the owner of the mortgaged land even after default and
therefore able to confer good title on the purchaser of the fixture. A
like result was reached in Clark v. Reyburn,'92 an action of replevin
by a mortgagee for a house sold by the mortgagor and removed by the
purchaser from the mortgaged premises. The court pointed out that
in lien states the mortgagee has no ownership and therefore no right
of possession and further, that if the mortgagee's position was sound,
replevin would lie for severed articles though their value would greatly
exceed the mortgaged debt, whereas the mortgagee's right of recovery
should be limited to his actual loss. Perhaps considerations such as
this influenced the decision in Kircher v. Schalk,'93 where the court,
while denying the right to sue in replevin, conceded the right of the
mortgagee to sue for damages. For substantially similar reasons,
other courts in lien jurisdictions have denied the right of the mort-
gagee to maintain replevin or its code equivalent.'94
To the extent that these decisions are made to turn on the right
of the mortgagee to possession, which is the issue in replevin, they
appear to rest on solid ground.'95 In some lien theory states, any
provision in the mortgage whereby the mortgagor agrees to give up
possession on default is regarded as void as being opposed to public
policy, and the mortgagee cannot obtain possession until foreclosure
189. 39 N. J. L. 335 (1877).
190. See note 178 supra.
191. McKelvey v. Creevey, 72 Conn. 464, 45 Atl. 4 (1900).
192. 1 Kan. 266 (1863).
193. See note 189 supra.
194. Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245, 247, 22 Pac. 184, 185 (1889);
Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433, 437 (1865) ; Moore v. Moran, 64 Neb. 84, 89 N. W.
629 (1902); Knoll v. N. Y., C. & St. Ry. Co., 121 Pa. 467, 15 Atl. 571 (1888);
Contra: Sands v. Pfeiffer, 10 Cal. 258 (1858).
195. People's Say. Bank v. Jones, 114 Cal. 422, 46 Pac. 278 (1896); Berthold
v. Holman, 12 Minn. 335 (1886) ; Gill v. Weston, 110 Pa. 312, 1 Atl. 921 (1885).
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has been completed.' 96 A holding in these jurisdictions that prior
to completion of foreclosure the mortgagee cannot pursue a severed
fixture is entirely consistent with this basic attitude. However, in
other lien theory states a mortgage provision giving the mortgagee
the right of possession on default is valid.117  In these jurisdictions
there ought not to be any technical obstacle to the mortgagee's recovery
in replevin where he is entitled to possession of the remainder of the
mortgaged premises, at least where the defendant is not a bona fide
purchaser for value and the removal has occasioned impairment.
Even in lien states it is the rule that a mortgagee in possession
may recapture a severed fixture that was once part of the mortgage
security... It would seem that in all states a mortgagee in possession
should be permitted to maintain replevin for wrongfully severed fix-
tures, where the equities of a bona fide purchaser are not involved.
In some jurisdictions, replevin is permitted where the severance
has resulted in impairment of the security.'99 This view is in harmony
with the majority rule governing the mortgagee's other remedies.
The suggestion has been advanced that replevin does not lie for
severed fixtures, since they remain part of the land and replevin lies
only for the return of personalty.200 This view seems unduly technical.
Surely an injured mortgagee cannot be expected to file ejectment for
the return of a severed lathe. Replevin, detinue, or their code equiv-
alents are appropriate actions for the recovery of severed fixtures.201
C. IN UJNcTION: In a few cases it has been held that any waste
of the mortgaged property is sufficient ground for a mortgagee to
maintain a suit to enjoin waste, but by far the greater weight of
authority limits the right of a mortgagee to maintain a suit to stay
waste to cases where the security of the mortgaged debt is impaired
or there is danger of the property becoming an insufficient security
for the mortgage. 2  In jurisdictions where the mortgagee by virtue
of his title may maintain suits at law for any damage to the mortgaged
196. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Canby Inv. Co., 190 Minn. 144, 251 N. W. 129
(1933); Hall v. Hall, 41 S. C. 163, 19 S. E. 305 (1893); State ex rel. Gwinn v.
Superior Court, 170 Wash. 463, 16 P. 2d 831 (1932).
197. Hall v. Goldsworthy, 136 Kan. 247, 14 P. 2d 659 (1932) ; Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Katz, 139 Neb. 501, 297 N. W. 899 (1941); Hulseman v. Dirks Land
Co., 63 S. D. 404, 259 N. W. 679 (1935).
198. Johnson v. Pac. Land Co., 84 Ore. 356, 164 Pac. 564 (1917).
199. Smith v. Altick, 24 Ohio St. 369 (1873); Waterman v. Matteson, 4 R. I.
539 (1857).
200. Roberts v. Dauphin Deposit Bank, 19 Pa. 71 (1852).
201. Adler v. Prestwood, 122 Ala. 367, 24 So. 999 (1899); Hensley v. Brodie,
16 Ark. 511 (1855) ; Dorr v. Dudderar, 88 Ill. 107 (1878).
202. See Note, 48 A. L. R. 1156 (1927).
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premises, it does not follow that the intervention of equity is called
for in cases involving only trivial acts of waste.0 The prevailing
rule seems to be that the mortgagee is entitled to be protected from
acts of waste which would so far impair the value of the property
as to render the security of doubtful sufficiency."' He is entitled to
have the mortgaged property preserved as sufficient security for the
payment of the debt, and it is not enough that its value may be barely
equal to the debt. That would not ordinarily be deemed sufficient to
one whose purpose is to secure payment, and not to become a pur-
chaser of the property at its market value. And not only must it be
considered that the mortgage is held to secure payment of the debt,
and not for the purpose of converting the mortgagee into a purchaser,
but that if the debt is not yet mature it is to be considered whether,
during the time which may elapse before maturity, the present value
of the property may not become depreciated from causes not now
known. This is a common sense recognition of the fact that a prudent
mortgagee will limit his loan to some percentage of the value of the
mortgaged property. The margin to which the mortgagee is entitled
must be determined in the light of business principles. 20 5
In lien jurisdictions that treat the mortgagor's prerogatives of
ownership as including the right to sever and sell fixtures free and
clear of the mortgage lien, it has been held that a court of equity will
decline to interfere with this right by injunction.0 6 Other courts that
also stress the inconvenience of a rule permitting the mortgagee to fol-
low or sue for severed fixtures nevertheless permit the mortgagee to
take preventive action by means of an injunction suit.2 7 Courts of the
latter persuasion seem to be influenced by regard for the purchaser
of the article, since by granting an injunction they, in effect, deny the
mortgagor's right to sever, but if the article has been severed, they
deny the right of the mortgagee to proceed against the purchaser.
D. OTHER REMEDIES: Fixtures which have been wrongfully sev-
ered and removed from the mortgaged land may be sold under a fore-
closure sale without first recovering possession thereof by an action at
law. The mortgage lien is not terminated by sale or removal of a
203. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Hoboken & M. R. R., 71 N. J. Eq. 14, 63 Atl. 273
(1906).
204. Moriarity v. Ashworth, 43 Minn. 1, 44 N. W. 531 (1890).
205. Beaver Lumber Co. v. Eccles, 43 Ore. 400, 73 Pac. 201 (1903).
206. Buckout v. Swift, 27 Cal. 433 (1865).
207. Cooper v. Davis, 15 Conn. 556 (1843); Tomlinson v. Thompson, 27 Kan. 70
(1882); Berthold v. Holman, 12 Minn. 335 (1867).
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fixture.2"" In First National Bank and Trust Company v. Hager Oil
Company,"9 the foreclosure court appointed a receiver to restore
wrongfully severed fixtures to the mortgaged premises. Where trover
or detinue are available, a bill in equity will not lie to compel restora-
tion of severed fixtures.
210
E. PROTECTION OF THIRD PARTIES AGAINST MORTGAGEE'S SUIT
FOR SEVERED FIXTURES: In jurisdictions where such actions will lie,
suits by a mortgagee for the severance and removal of fixtures or for
the foreclosure of the mortgage lien thereon necessarily call for applica-
tion of the rules of constructive notice. Clearly, since an innocent pur-
chaser or mortgagee of all of the mortgaged premises is protected
against an unrecorded real estate mortgage, even in title jurisdictions,
an innocent purchaser or mortgagee of part of the premises, such as
a fixture, must also be protected.211  The converse of the proposition,
that recording of a real estate mortgage imparts constructive notice to
all purchasers of fixtures, does not necessarily follow. A purchaser or
mortgagee of land can legitimately be required to search the land
records, and normally this will be done, usually at the expense of the
vendor or mortgagor. However, such a search ought not be required
where the transaction involved is the sale of a used lathe or refrigerator
which is at the time of the sale, to all appearances a chattel. Conceding
that a person who buys an artile while it is installed on the mortgaged
premises is charged with notice of a recorded mortgage, to hold
that this rule applies where the article has been severed and removed
from the premises and offered for sale at a time when it is, to all ap-
pearances, a chattel, seems to press the doctrine of contructive notice
to a harsh and illogical extreme. These considerations, unfortunately,
are rarely adverted to in the decisions.
The strongest case for the mortgagee can be made in strict title
jurisdictions. There a mortgagee who has filed his mortgage in the
land records has discharged his only duty to third persons, and, as
208. Johnson v. Bratton, 112 Mich. 319, 70 N. W. 1021 (1897); Mills v. Pope,
90 Mont. 569, 4 P. 2d 485 (1931) ; Turner v. Mebane, 110 N. C. 413, 14 S. E. 974
(1892); Dakota Loan & Trust Co. v. Parmalee, 5 S. D. 341, 58 N. W. 811 (1894).
Decisions of this character in lien states seem inconsistent with decisions denying the
right to maintain replevin. See notes 189 to 194, supra. This is particularly true
where, as in Johnson v. Bratton, supra, a bona fide purchaser is denied protection.
However, all cases cited ,rupra in this note involved removal of buildings; hence it
seems safe to assume that substantial impairment of security was present. Also, sev-
erance of such character certainly does not take place in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. See note 217, infra.
209. 105 N. J. Eq. 62, 146 Atl. 878 (1929).
210. Franks v. Cravens, 6 W. Va. 185 (1873).
211. Banton v. Shorey, 77 Me. 48 (1885) ; Security Co-operative Bank of Brock-
ton v. Holland Furnace Co., 274 Mass. 389, 174 N. E. 721 (1931).
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the technical owner of the wrongfully severed fixture, he may maintain
actions of trespass, trover, or replevin, even as against innocent third
persons.21
In states other than strict title theory states it is sometimes held
that the purchaser of a fixture is charged with notice of a recorded
mortgage.1 3 On the other hand, it has been held that actual knowl-
edge of the mortgage is necessary.214 Of course, in any jurisdiction
where constructive notice will suffice, actual notice will serve the same
purpose.215  Occasionally the decisions protect a bona fide purchaser
of the severed article.216
Cases which, while conceding the mortgagee's right to protection
by injunction against wrongful removal, deny the right of the mort-
gagee to maintain an action at law for the recovery of damages or for
return of the article itself seem to rest in part at least on an inclination
toward protection of purchasers who deal with a mortgagor in posses-
sion in the ordinary course of business.2 17 Underlying these decisions
212. Fitzgerald v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 176 Ark. 64, 3 S. W. 2d 30
(1928) ; Greenwald v. Graham, 100 Fla. 818, 130 So. 608 (1930) ; Burpee v. Athens
Production Credit Assn., 65 Ga. App. 102, 15 S. E. 2d 526 (1941) ; Jeffers v. Pease,
74 Vt. 215, 52 Atl. 422 (1902) ; Howe v. Wadsworth, 59 N. H. 397 (1879).
213. Johnson v. Bratton, 112 Mich. 319, 70 N. W. 1021 (1897); Webber v.
Ramsey, 100 Mich. 58, 58 N. W. 625 (1894); Jackson v. Turrel, 39 N. J. L. 329
(1877) ; Smith v. Altick, 24 Ohio St. 369 (1873) ; Hoskin v. Woodward, 45 Pa. 42
(1863) ; Dakota Loan & Trust Co. v. Parmalee, 5 S. D. 341, 58 N. W. 811 (1894).
214. Wilson v. Maltby, 59 N. Y. 126 (1874); Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110
(1850).
215. Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Keller et ux., 286 Mich. 403, 282 N. W. 194
(1938) ; Mills v. Pope, 90 Mont. 569, 4 P. 2d 485 (1931); Beck v. Zimmerman, 75
N. C. 60 (1876).
216. Cope v. Romeyne & Pitts, 4 McLean 384 (C. C. 7th 1848) ; Walch v. Beck,
230 Iowa 146, 296 N. W. 780 (1941) ; Betz v. Verner, 46 N. J. Eq. 256, 19 Atl. 206
(1890) ; Note, 7 L. R. A. 273, 279 (1890) ; cf. Fisher v. Patterson, 197 Ill. 414, 64
N. E. 353 (1902). In two cases involving removal of buildings it was said that a
bona fide purchaser of the land to which the building had been removed should be pro-
tected. Holland Canada Mortgage Co. v. Fraser [1926] 4 D. L. R. 993, 1003 (Sask.
C. A.) ; Travis-Barker v. Reed [1923] 3 D. L. R. 927, 931 (Can. Sup. Ct.).
217. McKelvey v. Creevey, 72 Conn. 464, 45 Atl. 4 (1900); Cooper v. Davis,
15 Conn. 556 (1843) ; Tomlinson v. Thompson, 27 Kan. 70 (1882) ; First Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. of Woodbury v. Hager Oil Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 62, 146 Atl. 878 (1929);
Kircher v. Schalk, 39 N. J. L. 335 (1877). The same result has occasionally been
reached by applying what is, in effect, an extension of the "good husbandry" excep-
tion allowed in Searle v. Sawyer, supra, note 175. By leaving the mortgagor in pos-
session the mortgagee, it has been said, impliedly authorizes him to carry on his
business in the usual way, and toward this end to annex and sever fixtures; hence
third persons dealing in good faith with the mortgagor in the ordinary course of
business will be protected. Gough v. Wood & Co. [1894] 1 Q. B. 713, 720; Sun Life
Assur. Co. of Canada v. Imperial Lumber Yards, Ltd. [1923] 4 D. L. R. 917, 921
(Sask. C. A.). The principle does not apply where the removal has not taken place
in the ordinary course of business, as in the building removal cases. Sun Life Assur.
Co. of Canada v. Imperial Lumber Yards, Ltd., supra. One difficulty with this view
lies in the fact that the mortgagee can effectively block this avenue of approach by a
provision in the mortgage, for there can be no implied authority where the mortgage
contains an express covenant against the removal of fixtures. Ellis v. Glover & Hob-
son, Ltd. [1908] 1 K. B. 388 (C. A.), criticized in Niles, The Rationale of the Law of
Fixtures, 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 560, 587 (1934) ; Holland Canada Mortgage Co. v.
Fraser [1926] 4 D. L. R. 993, 1000 (Sask. C. A.).
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is the conviction that if a mortgagor is to be permitted to occupy the
mortgaged premises as the ostensible owner thereof, he must be al-
lowed some freedom in dealing with third persons.
Where at the time of the sale or chattel mortgage of an article
it is installed in mortgaged premises in such a way as to suggest its
character as a fixture, the decisions tend to protect the real estate
mortgagee s.2 1  The fact that the articles are annexed to the realty and
adapted to its use serves to place purchasers and chattel mortgagees
on inquiry as to whether such articles are personalty or real estate.219
This solution, while not perfect, seems less objectionable than all others.
To relegate the real estate mortgagee to a damage suit against the
mortgagor is to compel him to rely upon the mortgagor's personal
responsibility, which is precisely what he declined to do when he in-
sisted that a mortgage be given. Any other rule would present the
mortgagor with the temptation and opportunity to salvage something
from his venture on the eve of foreclosure by stripping the mortgaged
premises of all removable chattels.2
Considerations of commercial convenience seem to be definitely
on the side of the rule protecting a bona fide purchaser of severed
articles. A puichaser of articles that are to all appearances chattels
may legitimately be required to search the chattel mortgage records
prior to completion of his purchase, for this is a duty the existing law
places on all purchasers of chattels, but to require a search of the land
records for real estate mortgages running back many years beyond the
refiling period applicable to chattel mortgages221 seems to place an
undue burden on purchasers or mortgagees of chattels where such
chattels bear no evidence that they were once installed on land. More-
over such a search, if made, would more often than not fail to reveal
the former connection of the article in question to the mortgaged prem-
ises. In general, it would seem that third persons are entitled to the
benefit of an objective test. This is but the converse of the rule gen-
erally prevailing that if articles subject to a chattel mortgage are affixed
to land so that they appear to be fixtures, persons dealing with the
218. Greenwald v. Graham, 100 Fla. 818, 130 So. 608 (1930) ; Guardian Life Ins.
Co. v. Swanson, 286 Ill. App. 278, 3 N. E. 2d 324 (1936) ; First Mortgage Bond Co.
v. London, 259 Mich. 688, 244 N. W. 203 (1932) ; Tyler v. Hayward, 235 Mich. 674,
209 N. W. 801 (1926); First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Woodbury v. Hager Oil
Co., 105 N. J. Eq. 62, 146 AtI. 878 (1929) ; John E. Mitchell Co. v. Chickasha Cotton
Oil Co., 173 Okla. 272, 47 P. 2d 590 (1935).
219. Russell & Teevan, The Package Mortgage, 12 LEGAL BULL. OF TRE UNITED
STATES SAVINGS & LOAN LEAGUE 17 (1946) ; 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 269 (1930).
220. Leisle v. Welfare Bldg. & Loan Assn., 232 Wis. 440, 447, 287 N. W. 739,
742 (1939).
221. 1 JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES 321 (6th ed. 1933);
Hanna, Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COL. L. REV. 617, 648 (1931).
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land are not obliged to search personal property records. The real
estate mortgagee can protect himself by filing his mortgage in the
chattel mortgage records, if the law permits, or by requiring and filing
a separate chattel mortgage. Certainly this additional expense, no
doubt passed on to the mortgagor with the other loan expenses, places
less burden on the business community than a rule requiring all
dealers in chattels to search the land records and to make inquiry of all
real estate mortgagees whose liens are thus revealed, to determine
whether the article in question was once annexed to the mortgaged
land. The protection, moreover, should extend to all types of actions
since it is little comfort to' an innocent purchaser of the severed chattels
to know he is safe against a replevin action if he may nevertheless be
held liable in damages for impairment of the mortgage security.
Even in title states innocent purchasers of severed fixtures should
be afforded protection. In these jurisdictions, a purchaser of a fixture
is protected against an unrecorded real estate mortgage and a pur-
chaser of land is protected against a prior unrecorded conditional sale
contract. The issue is not one of title, but of notice. The chattel
mortgage recording laws establish a policy of protecting innocent pur-
chasers of chattels against unrecorded liens. The policy expressed in
these decisions and statutes affords ample reason for protecting an
innocent purchaser of an apparent chattel against a mortgage recorded
only in the land records.
An innocent third party may occasionally invoke the doctrine of
accession. Thus, in Waich v. Beck,22 the mortgagor sold an old
house on the mortgaged premises to the defendant for twenty-five
dollars. The defendant, who was without actual knowledge of the
mortgage, demolished the structure and used the materials thereof
to erect a house on his own land at 'the cost of approximately
$900.00. In his foreclosure proceedings the mortgagee sought to
impress a lien on the structure thus erected, but the court protected
the defendant on the ground that where one, in reliance on a sup-
posed right, without intending any wrong, expends labor and material
on the property of another which greatly enhances its value,
and the value of the original property is insignificant in comparison
with the value of the finished product, title to the property in its con-
verted form will pass to the person who has thus added his labor and
materials, on his compensating the owner for the value of the original
property.
2 28
222. 230 Iowa 146, 296 N. W. 780 (1941).
223. Accord, Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568 (1880) ; Peirce v. Goddard, 22 Pick.
559 (Mass. 1839).
214 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
IX. THE QUESTION OF MATERIAL INJURY
The meaning of the phrase "material injury" differs according to
the context in which it occur§, and it is important, therefore, that dis-
tinctions between the various situations be kept constantly in mind.
Under the older decisions the character of an article as a fixture or
a chattel turned upon its removability without material injury to the
premises. This is the annexation test, which, as has been pointed
out, receives little emphasis in the modern decisions.224
Where the dispute is not one as to whether the article is or is
not a fixture, but is one placing in issue the right of a credit vendor
to remove articles installed on land, the question of material injury
is often of decisive importance, but even here distinctions must be
observed. In any situation involving the right of a credit vendor to
remove the article on default, the question of incidental injury to the
article itself would seem to be immaterial, despite numerous dicta to
the effect that removal should not be permitted where it entails sub-
stantial injury to the freehold or "to the article itself". 25 Surely,
where an article would otherwise be deemed removable, it is a matter of
complete indifference to the landowner or real estate mortgagee that
it must be removed piecemeal.226
Where the issue arises between the credit vendor and his pur-
chaser, the decisions tend to permit removal despite rather substantial
injury to the premises, apparently on the theory that the credit sale
impliedly licenses such damage to the structure housing the article as
is incidental to the removal thereof, and there is no reason why the
contract should not be enforced between the parties thereto. Thus,
where an oil well casing was sold under a conditional sale contract and
was thereafter imbedded and cemented in a well far below the earth's
surface, the court held that as between the immediate parties to the
contract the casing was removable on default even though the con-
ditional vendor had found it necessary to explode dynamite in the well
to loosen the casing. 27  This approach seems sound. If there is
present an element of public policy against destruction of improve-
ments on land, surely it is so tenuous that it ought not override a con-
224. Supra Part II.
225. Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A UNriF. LAWs ANN. 98
(1924).
226. Columbian Steel Tank Co. v. Vosika, 145 Neb. 541, 17 N. W. 2d 488 (1945)
(issue arose between a prior real estate mortgage and a subsequent conditional
vendor, and court permitted removal of a copper kettle that could be dismantled and
removed as scrap copper); Accord, Baker v. McClurg, 198 Il1. 28, 64 N. E. 701
(1902).
227. Jones v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe Corp., 381 Ill. 615, 46 N. E. 2d 67
(1943).
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tract provision so universal and so useful in credit sales of fixtures.
Cases involving articles like brick and stone that lose their identity
under the law of accession 22s are not likely to arise, since such articles
are not sold on conditional sale or chattel mortgage. Credit sales of
building materials are common, of course, but the materialman looks
to the mechanic's lien laws for his security.
Where the issue of removability arises between a credit vendor of
fixtures and a subsequent mortgagee of the land who has actual or con-
structive notice of the prior sale of fixtures, removal is usually per-
mitted. In such situations it is plain that the mortgagee acts with
knowledge of the risks involved and is consequently entitled to only
a minimum of consideration; and since the fixture recording laws were
enacted for the precise purpose of affording the credit vendor of fix-
tures a chance to protect himself against subsequent purchasers and
the mortgagees of the land,229 the laws should, under the familiar
rule, be so construed as to effectuate this purpose. To deny protection
to the credit vendor of fixtures in this situation would force credit
merchandisers to abandon credit sales of fixtures, a concededly un-
desirable result.3 Presumably the mortgagee under such circum-
stances relies on the security of the premises without regard to the
presence of the articles so purchased on credit, since he must have in
contemplation the fact that on default such articles will be repossessed.
Likewise the mortgagee must be held to consent to such damage to the
structure housing the articles as is incidental to removal.
The situation productive of greatest controversy is that in which
the issue arises between a real estate mortgagee and a subsequent
credit vendor of fixtures. Under the majority rule,2 31 removal is not
permitted where it would involve material injury to the premises. In
defining material injury this group splits into two camps: jurisdictions
following the rule that material injury means physical damage to the
remainder of the building arising in the process of removal of the
articles, and jurisdictions following the institutional doctrine. The
Uniform Conditional Sales Act seems to have had little effect on this
division of authority, for the conflict of opinion existed at common law
and continues to exist under the act.23 1 Under Section 7 of the Act,
228. Walch v. Beck, 230 Ia. 146, 296 N. W. 780 (1941); Peirce v. Goddard, 22
Pick. 559 (Mass. 1839); Madfes v. Beverly Development Corp., 251 N. Y. 12, 166
N. E. 787 (1929).
229. 2 UNiF. LAWS ANN. 13 (1922).
230. Note, 22 CoRN. L. Q. 421, 426 (1937), criticizing Smyth Sales Corp. v. Nor-
folk Bldg. & Loan Assn., 116 N. 3. L. 293, 184 Atl. 204 (1936).
231. Supra Part VII, C.
232. People's Savings & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N. W. 527
(1933).
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removability turns on "material injury to the freehold." Plainly the
term "freehold" was not used in its technical sense; 233 hence the courts
felt at liberty to read into this ambiguous phrase their own views of
the respective equities of prior mortgagee and subsequent conditional
vendor.
Under the view that material injury means physical damage to
the buildings exclusive of the fixtures in question, it seems that material
injury is not present as long as the shell of the building remains
relatively intact, since almost everything else is deemed removable.3 4
This shell consists of articles that have lost their identity.235 Removal
is permitted if it does not affect the "integrity of the structure on which
the mortgagees advanced." 236 It has been held that Section 7 of the
Uniform Act was intended to perpetuate this common law doctrine.
237
Columbian Steel Tank Company v. Vosika 238 affords an excellent illus-
tration of material injury to the freehold in the sense the phrase is used
by these courts. There a conditional vendor of equipment was denied
the right of removal as against a prior real estate mortgagee where
removal required the making of openings in the building walls and
such would materially weaken the structure. This view, it is said,
commands the support of most of the courts adhering to the majority
view.231 Certainly it has the virtue of simplicity, since the existence
of material physical injury to the building is something that can be
determined by the senses, whereas problems of interference with func-
tion involve troublesome abstractions. 240
A numerically inferior faction espouses the institutional doctrine.
These courts regard each building or enterprise as an operating whole,
not an assembly of removable parts. Under this view, the right of
removal should be denied the credit vendor of fixtures where removal
would result in material impairment of the efficient functioning of the
mortgaged property viewed as an operating institution.241
233. 30 MIcH. L. REv. 469 (1931).
234. See cases cited note 131 supra. It is not always clear from the decisions
whether the courts are laying down a test of fixtures or a test of impairment of the
mortgage security. Material injury to the building occasioned in the process of
removal has long been outmoded as a fixture test If the courts mean to decide
that there is no impairment of the mortgage security as long as the shell of the
building remains standing, mortgage experience today is in flat contradiction.
235. Bogert, Commentaries on Conditional Sales, 2A UNIF. LAWS ANN. 98
(1924).
236. Holt v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637, 641 (1914).
237. People's Savings & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N. W. 527
(1933).
238. 145 Neb. 541, 17 N. W. 2d 488 (1945).
239. Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 47 A. 2d 164 (Del. 1941).
240. Note, 22 CoRN. L. Q. 421, 424 (1937).
241. Dauch v. Ginsburg, 214 Cal. 540, 6 P. 2d 952 (1931) (conditional vendor
of plumbing fixtures installed in hotel building denied right of removal as against
prior real estate mortgagee) ; B. & 0. Radio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 N. J. L. 301,
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In appraising the merits of these two views of the respective
equities of a prior real estate mortgagee and a subsequent conditional
vendor, we must remember that the institutional doctrine is no novelty.
As an application of the adaptation test of fixtures it has found useful
application to industrial mortgages for over one hundred years,2 4 2 and
in situations not involving a dispute between a prior real estate mort-
gagee and a subsequent credit vendor of fixtures, this view has com-
manded very general support, even in the jurisdictions that have
repudiated it under its new name.243 Also, while the equities of the
credit seller of chattels are entitled to consideration, the equities of the
mortgage-banker ought not be ignored. Mortgage loans on vacant
buildings are rare. Where a mortgage loan is made to a businessman,
it is the going concern with its going concern value'" on which the
mortgage banker relies.245 Even a distressed property has going con-
cern value,24 and indeed the compelling motive of an equity receiver-
ship is the preservation of this going concern value.24 When a credit
vendor exercises his right of removal, leaving the walls of the build-
ing intact but disrupting operations, has he not occasioned a diminu-
tion of the going concern value of the security? 248  Recognition that
such is indeed the case is implicit in the decisions denying the right
of removal of replacement articles, for removal of such articles takes
184 Atl. 208 (1936) (refrigerator system in apartment building held not removable
as against prior real estate mortgagee) ; Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N. J. Eq.
313, 178 Atl. 788 (Ch. 1935) (conditional vendor of furnace in dwelling denied right
of removal against prior real estate mortgagee); Domestic Electric Co., Inc. v.
Mezzaluna, 109 N. J. L. 574, 162 Atl. 722 (1932) (conditional vendor of refrigerators
and gas ranges installed in apartment building denied right of removal as against
prior real estate mortgagee) ; Land Title Bank and Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302
14 A. 2d 282 (1940) (conditional vendor of elevator installed in apartment building
denied right of removal as against prior real estate mortgagee); cf. General Heat
& Appliance Co. v. Goodwin, 316 Mass. 3, 54 N. E. 2d 67 (1944).
242. See Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. 116 (Pa. 1841).
243. Compare the following: Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Knowles, 8
Del. Ch. 106, 67 Atl. 961 (1896), with Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp.,
47 A. 2d 164 (Del. App. 1941); Bass Foundry Works v. Gallentine, 99 Ind.
525 (1844), with Citizens Bank v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 216 Ind. 573, 25 N. E.
2d 444 (1940) ; also First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Adams, 218 Wis. 406, 261 N. W.
16 (1935) and Taylor v. Collins, 51 Wis. 123, 130-131 (1880), with Peoples Savings &
Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N. W. 527 (1933).
244. As to going concern value, see Isaacs, The Unit Rule, 35 YALE L. J. 838,
844-845 (1926).
245. It is the machinery and equipment which convert the four walls of the fac-
tory building into a valuable industrial property. Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v.
Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A. 2d 282 (1940).
246. In foreclosures of industrial mortgages the land, buildings and machinery
must be sold as an entirety, since they are a unit and cannot be disintegrated and the
parts sold separately without large depreciation. Hill v. National Bank, 97 U. S.
450 (1878) ; Detroit Trust Co. v. Detroit City Service Co., 262 Mich. 14, 247 N. W.
76 (1933).
247. Coriell v. Morris White, Inc., 54 F. 2d 255 (2d Cir. 1931).
248. Note, 83 U. op PA. L. Rav. 916 (1935).
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away something that was present when the mortgage loan was made-
going concern value.249
In the leading case of Campbell v. Roddy,2 50 the court placed
squarely on the chancellor's shoulders the duty of preserving "the
right of the prior real estate mortgagee in the same degree of security
which he would have enjoyed had the property remained as when
mortgaged." Material impairment of the security is the test.
2 51  If
removal will result in such impairment, "then it was the folly or mis-
fortune of the holder of the chattel mortgage that he permitted the
property to be annexed to the freehold from which it cannot be re-
moved without diminishing or impairing an existing mortgage
thereon." 252 This is the test laid down in an overwhelming majority
of the decisions involving damages or injunction suits for removal of
fixtures.25 3 In determining whether material impairment of the secu-
rity's value will take place, it would seem that all elements of value,
including going concern value, should be considered.
Perhaps to some the institutional solution is suggestive of the
dilemma of Shylock. The credit vendor may remove his pound of
flesh, but must not shed a drop of going concern blood. The shadow
of the right remains, but the substance is taken away. Moreover, if
going concern value is of vital importance it is arguable that the prop-
erty should be made to bear the expense of needed replacements.
2 54
Normally the credit vendor will be content to receive from the mort-
gagee the balance due on the contract, and the mortgagee could be
protected by allowing him to add any sums thus advanced to the mort-
gage debt. If the mortgagor fails to make redemption, the mortgagee
will be made whole by ultimate realization of the enhanced value of
the premises. This solution, however, fails to take into account the
possibility that the mortgagee, as depression experience frequently
demonstrated, may simply lack funds to meet an emergency such as
this. Moreover, the mortgagee is left without protection against an
unannounced repossession that leaves the enterprise stripped of equip-
ment essential to operation, for even the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act provides for notice of repossession only to the buyer. 5
However this controversy is ultimately decided, the fact remains
that, for the present, the institutional tide seems to be running fairly
249. Comly v. Lehmann, 218 Iowa 644, 253 N. W. 501 (1934); Bass Foundry
Works v. Gallentine, 99 Ind. 525 (1884) ; Note, 90 U. OF PA. L. REV. 77 (1941).
250. 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 252, 14 Atl. 279, 283 (1888).
251. Binkley v. Forkner, 117 Ind. 176, 19 N. E. 753 (1889).
252. Id. at 184, 19 N. E. at 756.
253. Supra Part VIII, A and C.
254. Wolf Co. v. Herman Savings Bank, 168 Mo. App. 549, 153 S. W. 1094
(1913).
255. UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 17, 2 UNiF. LAWs ANN. 28.
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strong. While the jurisdictions formally committed to the doctrine
are few in number, the view continues to gain adherents by the back
door, so to speak. Often decisions are reached on institutional
grounds, sometimes with citation of institutional authorities, but with-
out apparent awareness of the allegiance thus declared.25
In jurisdictions that continue to adhere to the doctrine that no
material injury is involved as long as the four walls of the building
remain standing, it has occasionally been held that some compensation
should be provided the mortgagee for such damage as does in fact
occur. For example, in a case where the conditional vendor's right
of removal was questioned by a prior real estate mortgagee, the court,
while it held that removal of the machinery in question would not
entail material injury to the freehold, required the conditional vendor
to give adequate security that such damage as was in fact occasioned
by the removal would be completely repaired by him after the ma-
chinery had been removed.257 Pennsylvania has a statute making a
somewhat similar provision. 258  Under the Pennsylvania amendments
to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act removal is allowed as against a
prior mortgagee even where material injury to the freehold is involved,
but the conditional vendor must post a bond to repair any damage
caused to the interest of the prior encumbrancer. 25 9 Statutory author-
ity for the imposition of this condition or limitation on the conditional
vendor's right of removal seems unnecessary. Where removal by the
conditional vendor would occasion some diminution in the value of the
freehold, then the depreciation must first be made whole to the real
estate mortgagee before the conditional sale can be recognized.26° Or
as otherwise stated, where severance of the articles might impair the
security of the prior mortgagee to some extent, the rights of the parties
should be adjusted on equitable principles.2"' This might necessitate
sale of the mortgaged premises with the articles installed therein, with
an equitable division of the proceeds of sale.26 2
256. E. g., Viking Equipment Co. v. Central Hotel Co., 230 Mo. App. 304, 91
S. W. 2d 94 (1936) (removal of sprinkling system from hotel would render building
"almost wholly unfit for use as a hotel"); Mortgage Bond Co. v. Stephens, 181
Okla. 419, 74 P. 2d 361 (1937) (court quotes from Ege v. Kille, 84 Pa. 333, 340
(1877) that "if article is indispensable in carrying on the specific business, it be-
comes part of the realty"). See also authorities cited supra Part II.
257. It re Voight-Pros't Brewing Co., 115 F. 2d 733 (6th Cir. 1940), 19 CEi.-
KENT. RFv. 297 (1941).
258. Kleps, Uniformity Versus Uniforn Legislation: Conditional Sale of Fix-
tures, 24 CORN. L. Q. 394, 400, 407, 409 (1939).
259. Id. at 394, 407.
260. Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244, 252, 14 Atl. 279, 284 (1888).
261. Binkley v. Forkner, 117 Ind. 176, 185, 19 N. E. 753, 757 (1889) ; Hurxthal
v. Hurxtlial, 45 W. Va. 584, 32 S. E. 237 (1898).
262. Hurxthal v. Hurxthal, 45 W. Va. 584, 32 S. E. 237 (1898).
